The processes leading to increased economic integration and closer political union in Europe are redefining the relationship between the European Union and the Caribbean. In respect of the Single European Market the Caribbean is provided with an opportunity to develop new products and services for sale in the European Union as at the same time it is faced with serious threats to the future viability of its traditional trade, particularly in bananas. The Maastricht Treaty is also having a contradictory effect, dissolving differences between different parts of the Caribbean in relation to the European Union on issues such as immigration, drug trafficking and development policy while widening them on others such as citizenship and social issues. The net effect of these changes is an erosion of traditional bilateral relations in respect of Europe's relation with the Caribbean and the accentuation of differences of interest within the Caribbean as regards its economic and political interests in Europe. The Caribbean must recognise these changes in negotiating a new relationship with the European Union once the Lomé Convention expires in the year 2000.
Los procesos que conducen hacia una creciente integración económica y una unión política más estrecha en Europa están redifiniendo las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y el Caribe. En el marco del Mercado Unico Europeo, el Caribe cuenta con la oportunidad de desarrollar nuevos productos y servicios destinados a la venta en la Unión Europea a la vez que enfrenta series amenazas a la viabilidad futura de su comercio tradicional, especialmente los plátanos. El Tratado de Maastricht tiene también un efecto contradictorio, ya que disuelve las diferencias entre las diversas partes del Caribe y la Unión Europea sobre temas tales como la inmigración, el tráfico de drogas y las politicas de desarrollo, al mismo tiempo que aumenta las divergencias sobre otros, tales como la ciudadanía y algunos problemas sociales. El efecto neto de estos cambios es una erosión de las relaciones bilaterales tradicionales en el marco de las relaciones entre Europa y el Caribe, y una acentuación de las diferencias de intereses en el Caribe mismo con respecto a sus intereses económicos y politicos en Europa. El Caribe debe reconocer estos cambios en el momento de renegociar su nueva relación con la Unión Europea cuando expire, en el año 2000, la Convención de Lomé.
The establishment of the Single European Market (SEM) with effect from 1 January 1993 and the creation of the European Union (EU) with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993 have had the effect of reconfiguring relations within Western Europe and reshaping its relations with the rest of the world. One region where these developments have been viewed with particular concern is the Caribbean which has had a dose relationship with Europe for more than five hundred years. The foundations of this relationship have been 'exclusive'bilateral links between the metropolitan powers and specific Caribbean islands and enclaves which have resulted in a host of political relationships and a wide range of economic ties. In total, these have both bound the Caribbean closer to Europe and privileged it in comparison to many other developing regions. The fear in the Caribbean, quite simply, is that the Maastricht Treaty and the SEM presages the end of such relationships and attendant arrangements as the EU takes on a more multilateral stance in its formulation of interests and its promotion of economic policy.
This article examines these fears and assesses the likely consequences of the SEM and the EU on the Caribbean in the present and future. It finds that the immediate impact of the SEM on the Caribbean is not that great, but that in the midterm, and especially the longterm, the Caribbean has some cause for concern. The same conclusion holds for the KU, with the added proviso that the Caribbean must recognise that the spillover from closer integration in Europe wiü increasingly call for nuanced policies from the Caribbean to accommodate its differential effects. Accordingly it suggests that the Caribbean should take immediate advantage of a relatively benign shortterm to reconsider and revise its relationships with the EU in the longer term.
The SEM has been created by the Single European Act of 1987 which proposed a European Community (EC) 'without internal frontiers' by the end of December 1992. In effect, this meant the removal of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the EC and the creation of 'new frontiers' with the rest of the world. Questions relating to this second dimension, however, were clearly subordinate to the first. In the discussion in the EC on the SEM, and in the technical studies prepared for its implementation, the focus was within Europe. Little consideration, if any, was given to the external consequences of the SEM. Accordingly, the best that the much cited Cecchini Report on the benefits of the SEM could come up with was the 'guestimate' that the SEM would increase trade by one per cent. Translated into benefits for the developing world this was presented as a 'shot in the arm' that would rebound marginally to the advantage of these countries and act as a stimulus for their development (1).
The degree to which this may, or may not, be the case has been the subject of several studies. One of the most persuasive was that undertaken by Michael Davenport and Sheila Page entitled Europe: 1992 and the Developing World (2). They present an estimate of the impact of the SEM which suggests a net trade benefit to the developing world of ECU 6,781 million*, or approximately five per cent of their total exports. To this could be added an additional ECU 1,600 million were the public procurement rules in respect of aid relaxed to allow developing countries to buy from the cheapest source. Although the SEM stipulates the opening of public procurement throughout the KU, this is unlikely to happen in the bilateral aid sector (approximately 85 per cent of all European aid) where more than 50 per cent of aid remains tied.
Davenport and Page thus present a positive picture overall, but they also qualify it in respect of individual countries. For example, in respect of trade creation and diversion they note that for many countries, particularly those engaged in manufacturing, the gains are cancelled out by losses. They also note that whatever scheme is adopted for bananas (and they set out several in an appendix to their study) St Lucia and St Vincent will lose with an attendant 'serious danger of a major political and social upheaval' (3).
They also note that in many ways it is not the numbers that matter but the wider intangible effects on investment and external relations. They therefore argue that the opportunities presented within the SEM has diverted investment from the developing world; and that it is by no means clear that the EC will avoid the temptation to impose the costs of internal adjustment within the SEM by imposing costs outside. This could mean not only an increase in non-tariff barriers but also a boost to thinking which sees the future of the world trading system in terms of blocs. This last observation has a particular resonance for the Caribbean which finds itself uncomfortably situated between an evolving North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and a consolidating EU to each of which it needs access and from each of which it needs financili support, if its development potential is to be maximised (4).
The framework for Caribbean trade with the EC is provided by the Fourth Lomé Convention. This covers all the independent Caribbean countries, except Cuba, and by extension all the dependent territories, except those of the USA. The trade regime under Lomé is very liberal allowing nonreciprocal duty free access to the EC for most goods and services produced in the region. In 1991 the value of visible trade with the EC for the Caribbean ACP alone (i.e. excluding the OCT and the DOM) was ECU 1,332.6 million, some 20 per cent of their total exports (5).
Notwithstanding its importance to the region, the record on trade is disappointing. It is dominated by traditional commodities and highly dependent on preferential access to the EC, codified in the case of sugar, bananas, rum and rice in separate protocols. These protocols not only maintain privileged access but also provide indirect price support. The sugar industry, particularly in CARICOM, could not survive commercially without the protocol and the same applies to the banana industry which has relied on preferential national regimes to maintain viability. The value of the former to the Commonwealth Caribbean has been estimated by the European Commission as ECU 527.8 million above world market price 1981/85 inclusive and of the latter as a subsidy above world market of US$ 149 million for the same period. In all, the World Bank has estimated that over the period 198087 preferential arrangements have provided around US$ one billion in resource transfers to the Caribbean ACP (6).
Where preference is not so marked, the record in visible trade is poor. The Caribbean has not been able to expand nontraditional trade with the EC. Instead, the emphasis has been on the expansion of services. These have featured in a substantial way only in the Fourth Convention and therefore the growth of recent years cannot be directly attributed to Lomé. Instead, the Caribbean has capitalised on 'natural advantages' to develop offshore financial services and tourism. Both these sectors engage overwhelmingly with the US. However, in both there is also a significant European dimension and in respect of tourism it is one that has been directly encouraged by the European Commission in its development strategies for the region.
The Lomé Conventions thus confer significant advantages and provide substantial benefits to the Caribbean. Although the aid component is important, it is, according to one well informed assessment 'trade, particularly through the special protocols in sugar and bananas, [that] is still the dominant effective element in the assistance package' (7). It therefore follows that any prospect of changes to this situation was necessarily alarming to the region. Indeed, it is no surprise to find that among the ACP it was the Caribbean that first became aware of the impact the SEM might have on their development and who convened the first EuropeCaribbean Conference to consider this matter in September 1988. Since then five other annual conferences on this theme have been held, the last in Santo Domingo in November 1993. The conferences have uniformly drawn attention to the problems that the SEM raises for Caribbean traditional trade, particularly in bananas. But they have also established that new opportunities will open up for the Caribbean in Europe if it adopts the right economic and political strategies. The SEM must therefore be viewed not simply as a threat but also as an opportunity for Caribbean business and for Caribbean governments to reengage with the EU in new ways.
The positive and negative effects of the SEM on Caribbean commerce are relatively clear and are set out below (8). It is also apparent, however, that there are some effects that are relatively neutral. Insofar as these cover important areas of Caribbean commerce, these must also be noted.
Positive Effects/Opportunities
The single greatest beneficial effect of the SEM is likely to lie in the tourism sector (9). Tourism currently provides about 25 per cent of expon receipts for the Caribbean and direct and indirect employment for around 450,000 persons. In the five year period 198~90 some 51.4 million tourists visited the region, of which 6.4 million were from Europe. More to the point, tourist arrivals from Europe nearly doubled in this period. They also usually stay longer than US tourists and spend significantly more per day US$ 1,275 per visit as compared to US$ 725 for US tourists. They also do not make as strong a distinction between the winter season and summer season as do North American tourists, so contributing to occupancy rates throughout the year.
The main destinations for European tourists in 1990 were Guadeloupe and Martinique, which together attracted some 325,800 European visitors, mainly French; Barbados, 152,000, mainly British; St Maarten, 132,900; Jamaica 121,000; and the Bahamas, 96,000. The Dominican Republic received an estimated 68,200 and Cuba 145,000, of which 60,000 came from Germany and 40,000 from Spain.
The presumption, of course, is that these figures can be bettered as disposable income in the EC rises as a consequence of the SEM. There is some support for this argument from experience. In 1993 there was a 10 per cent increase in arrivals from Europe bringing its total arrivals to 2.25 million.The most dynamic European markets were Germany (a 41 per cent increase to 450,000), Britain (a 13 per cent increase to 490,000), and France (an 8 per cent increase to 520,000). Strong growth was also recorded for Italy and Spain (10). These are the countries with among the highest per capita incomes in Europe. But the increase was also the result of effective market promotion directly backed by the EC, which is now supplying significant support to the Caribbean Tourism Organisation and to the establishment by it of permanent offices in Germany, Denmark and Italy. Further growth can therefore be expected. At the same time, though, the French, British and Dutch markets were slack from 1990 to 1992 indicating that levels of demand may already be near their peak. There is thus nothing automatic about the growth of European tourism in the Caribbean. It will have to be worked for in an environment in the EU that is increasingly competitive and in which the real returns to the host countries are not often as great as they seem once the costs of promotion, infrastructure, imports and profit repatriation are considered.
The 'locomotive effect' of higher disposable income may also benefit the Caribbean in the area of nontraditional trade. It has already been established that up to now the record in this sector is disappointing. However, there is now a greater awareness in the Caribbean of the need to be competitive in external markets and to establish an active marketing strategy in favour of selected goods in specific markets. In other words to identify niches where Caribbean products can be sold.
The experience of Britain suggests there are four main nontraditional niche markets for Caribbean goods: an ethnic market for Caribbean foodstuffs and beverages; one for natural resourcebased materials and their derivatives; another for machine manufactures and scientific instruments; and garments and apparel (11). The prospects for the first and last of these markets have been investigated in several studies. In both cases they show that a more positive approach is needed by the Caribbean. In respect of the ethnic market growth prospects are poor so the Caribbean can expand only by 'crossing over' into the 'exotica' market. In turn, this will require greater attention to quality and particular attention to international marketing practices. It may also require some consolidation of the fragmented Caribbean food industry to reap economies of scale and learning and to provide a suffficient production base to establish joint ventures and promote product development.
The export of garments and apparel to the SEM must also be more vigorously pursued if there is to be any success (12). At present, only Jamaica is involved in any scale, with 10 per cent of its garment exports going to the EC in 1990. Other Caribbean countries sell far less with a similar production system, so there is obviously room for expansion. At the same time there are difficulties to be overcome. One of the most notorious is sourcing yarn in order to meet the stringent 'rules of origin' provisions of the Lome Convention. Others relate to design, response time, and product and market development. However, these are not insuperable and there are good prospects for Caribbean producers to exploit market niches at the midrange of the market. Leisurewear and swimwear are particularly promising in this regard, especially since they can be promoted through and in association with tourism.
Neutral Effects
Exports of Caribbean ACP sugar (the Dominican Republic excepted) to the EC are covered by the terms of the Sugar Protocol which was negotiated alongside but is independent of the Lome conventions. The Protocol is based on four elements: the principle of a mutual purchasing/supply commitment for agreed quantities at a guaranteed price for an indefinite period. It allows for a favourable price (in reœnt years some three times the world market price) for around twothirds of ACP Caribbean sugar production and practically all their sugar exports. Indeed, to meet the terms of the Protocol and to receive the premium price associated with it, several ACP states have imported sugar in recent years to cover domestic demand.
Since the Sugar Protocol is contractual and indefinite it is not directly affected by the SEM. At the same time there are developments in the EC which contribute to an erosion of its value and so render the Protocol a 'wasting asset' for the Caribbean ACP (l3). One of these concerns price. The price received by the ACP for their raw cane sugar is largely determined by the intervention price paid for beet sugar grown in the EC. This, in turn, is covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC. It is no secret that in recent years the CAP has been under attack as wasteful and pricedistorting, both within the EC and by GATT. Its reform can be confidently anticipated and in the case of sugar this means an anticipated decrease in the intervention price of 710 per cent in the next six years. The price received by Caribbean ACP exporters will reduce by the same amount (prices were frozen in 1984/85 and reduced 1989/90 and 1993/94) so proportionately eroding the advantage the ACP maintain over world price levels.
The other concerns access. In reality all Caribbean ACP sugar is sold for refining in Britain by Tate and Lyle. The continuation of the Sugar Protocol is thus predicated on the willingness of Tate and Lyle to continue to buy cane sugar and on the British government's willingness to meet part of the domestic demand for sugar through cane imports. At present neither are under threat, and indeed Tate and Lyle has returned to the Caribbean to manage the sugar industry in Jamaica, Guyana, St Kitts and Barbados. However, these arrangements do render the Caribbean particularly dependent at a time of generalised crisis in the sugar industry which is once again raising ageold questions in the region about its viability. Any failure by the Caribbean to maintain significant levels of production inevitably reduce the commitment by Britain and Tate and Lyle to the Protocol, thereby inviting demands from countries such as Germany for its review if not its actual termination.
The other major neutral effect, at least in the shortrun, derives from the Rum Protocol. This establishes an annual quota of rum to be imported dutyfree into the EC. The major importer of ACP rum is, and has been, Britain and the major suppliers in the past have been Guyana, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad (their quota for 1993/94 being 224,827 hectolitres). Under Lome IV the Protocol is to be phased out by the end of 1995 after which the market will be open for competition. In theory, this will favour the Caribbean ACP (including Haiti and the Dominican Republic) as rum is one industrial product where the ACP producers have achieved international competitiveness. At the same time, it must be noted that the Rum Protocol was negotiated at French insistence to protect its highcost and lower quality rum producers. The way they have interpreted the Protocol in the past and at present is one which continues to provide every protection to their own producers and to insist that the EC allocate global quotas strictly according to the rules. Although after 1995 this will no longer apply, a strong rearguard action has been fought by the French to protect by quota 'traditional dark rum' produced in the DOM for a further five years (14). Prospects for further growth in rum exports by the Caribbean ACP are therefore likely to remain artificially limited in a market the European Commission claim is already 'saturated' with alcohol.
Negative Effects/Constraints
The future of banana exports from the Caribbean ACP and the French DOM have been by far the most contentious issue in the discussion of the impact of the SEM on the region (15). Bananas dominated the first European-Caribbean Conference and they have caused many a sleepless night throughout Europe and the Caribbean as officials, businessmen and politicians have formulated and argued over scheme after scheme, with relatively little headway or agreement being realised.
The main material facts appear relatively simple (16). The import and sale of bananas in the EC has traditionally been based on various national arrangements which in effect compartmentalise the market. In the cases of Britain France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy the markets operate in favour of either EC produced bananas (21 per cent of the market in 1990, with imports overwhelmingly from the Caribbean DOM and the Canary Islands) or ACP produced bananas from traditional suppliers (19 per cent of the market in 1990, overwhelmingly from the Windward Islands, Jamaica, Belize and Suriname in the Caribbean and the Ivory Coast and Cameroon in Africa). Other EC states obtain their supplies (60 per cent of the market in 1990) from the 'dollar zone' (Central America and South America) subject to a customs duty of 20 per cent with the exception of Germany, the main consumer country (35 per cent of consumption in 1990), where customs duties are waived under a quota arrangement covering its entire consumption.
These arrangements have been deemed incompatible with the SEM since they do not permit the free circulation of goods. The task of the European Commission has therefore been to devise a scheme which replaces the segmentalised market. This would be relatively easy were EC produced and ACP produced bananas competitive with 'dollar bananas', but they are not. The existence of national import arrangements has given rise to considerable differences between EC states regarding consumption (the Germans eat 35.7 Ibs of bananas a year compared to the European average of 22.3 Ibs); prices (in Germany in August 1991 bananas cost US$ 1.30 a kilo compared to US$ 2.07 in Britain); production costs (Latin American production costs per kilo are less than one half those of the Caribbean ACP and just under one third of the Caribbean DOM); quality (it is said that the quality of Caribbean fruit is below that of 'dollar fruit'); and marketing (wholesale retail margins in Britain, where a complicated system of licences apply, are double those of Germany). Any opening of the market to cheaper 'dollar bananas' would mean the end of production for export by the DOM and most of the Caribbean ACP.
Such a prospect was not only inconceivable for the French in the case of the DOM (where they provide 40 per cent by value of agricultural exports and employ 12,000 persons) but also incompatible with the Banana Protocol of Lomé IV. In Article 1 this states that 'In respect of its banana exports to the Community markets, no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in the past or present'. The free circulation of 'dollar bananas' within the EC would clearly jeopardise such a contractual obligation. It would also have serious consequences for the Caribbean ACP, particularly the Windward Islands, where in 1990 bananas sold to the EC (nearly all to Britain) accounted for 56 per cent of the export earnings of Dominica, 62 per cent of those of St Lucia and 54 per cent of St Vincent. In all, more than 40 per cent of the population of the ~mdwards are directly or indirectly involved in the banana industry and the dependence on the crop has grown in recent years as the tonnage produced has increased from 164,000 tonnes in 1985 to 278,00C tonnes in 1990.
The problem facing the EC was to reconcile all the above. In practice, however, this proved to be virtually impossible. In April 1992, after more than two years of study and consultation, the Commission proposed a quota based solution which would have reserved current market levels for the ACP and the EC while imposing a 20 per cent tariff on 'dollar bananas' which account for the remainder. This proved unacceptable to Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries and new proposals were put forward by Britain in December. These set a two million tonne quota at a tariff of ECU 100 per tonne (approximately 20 per cent) for all 'dollar bananas' entering the EC. Imports above that level were be subject to a tariff of ECU 850 (approximately 170 per cent). A basic tariff-free quota was set for ACP bananas up to the greatest volume shipped up to 1990 and a 'partnership' scheme was devised whereby 'dollar banana' operators who market ACP produce were to be favoured in the distribution of licences. The proposals were opposed by Denmark and Germany but agreed by other ministers, subject to final consideration. When this took place in Brussels in February 1993, Belgium and The Netherlands joined with Germany (though not Denmark which now occupied the rotating presidency of the EC and was obliged to seek consensus) in raising new objections. After some revision of the proposals to allow for an upward adjustment of the 'dollar banana' quota in line with market demand and a review of the proposals if there were any significant price increases, plus assurances that traditional importers of 'dollar bananas' would not be prejudiced by the new licensing system, the new regime was adopted, to take effect from 1 July 1993.
In Latin America the new regime was seen as a victory for the Caribbean ACP. Objections were raised in the GATT, at the OAS and in joint meetings with CARICOM. The German government also filed a request for annulment of the regulation to the European Court of Justice. The German petition was not upheld although the EC did respond with an amended offer to some Latin American countries in December 1993. This proposed an increase in the tariff quota for imports of dollar bananas from 2 million to 2.2 million tonnes from 1995 and the division of the global quota into specific quotas for each country. The offer was conditional on the withdrawal of the complaint from GATT. The Latin American countries did not agree and as expected the GATT ruled that the preference given to ACP bananas was incompatible with the provisions of the GATT and therefore should be eliminated. This finding was rejected by the EC. However, in a reversal of their previous stance they kept the offer on the table and in subsequent negotiations a new agreement was reached with Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Nicaragua. This established an increased global quota of 2.2 million tonnes determined for each country on the basis of its historic exports to the KU, plus a reduction of tariff within the quota from ECU 100 to ECU 75 per tonne. The offer was rejected by Guatemala, Panama Ecuador, Honduras and Mexico who resolved to take the dispute to the new World Trade Organization. One final twist to this complicated story was provided toward the end of 1994 when the US Trade Representative (in response to complaints by Chiquita Brands International and the Hawaii Banana Industry Association) initiated an investigation into the EC banana regime under Section 301 of the US Trade Act. The outcome to this enquiry is still awaited.
The EC market for ACP and DOM bananas has been secured for the moment. However, it is clear that in the medium to longterm renewed challenges will come from Latin American banana producers and from the large US banana multinationals. Both have invested in new production in recent years in anticipation of a more open EC market post1992 and both face a stagnant US market. Furthermore, the Banana Protocol refers only to access, not to prices which have fallen steeply in the last two years. The preferential market for bananas ends in the Year 2002. The ACP and the DOM will therefore have to address the question of future access and competitive price if they are to remain as exporters to the EC. In the meantime a special system of income support and financial and technical assistance over three years, worth some ECU 50 million in 1993, has been approved as an ancillary measure to enable them to offset income losses and promote new marketing initiatives (17).
In general terms the balance of costs and benefits of the SEM to the Caribbean are not dissimilar to those for the developing world as a whole. The Caribbean is a prospective beneficiary in respect of tourism and niche markets in exotic foods, garments, and potentially, rum. It has also secured support for the time being for sugar and bananas. However, for both these commodities 'exceptional'conditions apply and neither are able to benefit from the trade creation aspect of the SEM in primary products since the amount of sugar and bananas to be imported are, in effect, fixed. The Caribbean is here dependent on preference and in the long run faced with a 'wasting asset' in respect of sugar (through price erosion) and a challenge in respect of bananas (by those seeking to weaken the new regime). In the shortterm the Caribbean neither wins nor loses, but in the mediumterm it must seek to promote the opportunities it has through innovative product development and marketing. In the same timeframe it must also review the future of sugar and bananas, with particular attention to the latter. It is, for example, noteworthy that political leaders in the Windward Islands were very active in Europe in defence of their interests but remarkably inactive in their own islands in promoting any debate or review on the future of the banana industry (l8).
The Maastricht Treaty, concluded on 7 February 1992, establishes the European Union. This deepens the processes of integration between the member states by developing existing areas of cooperation and identifies new areas of common policy in respect of the external frontiers of the KU. The EU is defined as consisting of three pillars: the European Community treaties and economic and monetary union; a common foreign and security policy; and cooperation in the spheres of home affairs and justice. The developing world will feel the effects of new policies and arrangements in a number of areas including immigration, rights of asylum, visa policy, consular access and so forth, although the most immediate and farreaching will be in development policy. The Maastricht Treaty establishes development cooperation as a Community policy which supplements its member states continuing bilateral development policies. In Title XVII it defines the objectives (Article 130U) and the methods (Article 130V and Article 130X) and gives greater scope for the European Commission and the European Parliament to influence the shape and content of development policy. It also sets in train a process whereby a common development policy will emerge (not a single development policy) in support of a common foreign and security policy.
The principles and objectives which will define development policy postMaastricht were set out in outline by the Commission in its document'Development Policy in the Runup to 2000' and endorsed by the Council of Ministers in their meeting of November 1992. These are:
In statements and documents issued since then the Commission has made it clear that these principles and objectives will inform its approach to the renegotiation of the various agreements it has with developing countries, including the Mid Term Review of the Lomé Convention, the protocols with the Southern Mediterranean countries, and the guidelines which determine its relations with Asia and Latin America.
To date, the most important changes brought about relate to the Mid Term Review of the Lomé Convention. When the Convention was signed in December 1989, provision was made for it to be reviewed half way through its tenyear lifetime, along with the renewal of the Financial Protocol (the 'add' component of the Convention). The review process is in its final stages. The emphasis from the Community has been on conditionality in order to promote human rights, good governance and democracy; as well as the better use (including unilateral determination by the Commission) of procedures and instruments relating to the identification, allocation and disbursement of aid. The emphasis from the ACP has been on measures to improve trade in agriculture, commodities and services; plus additional aid, particularly for the private sector and Stabex. The issues involved have created considerable controversy and are as yet still unresolved. However, it is increasingly clear that the EU regard the Lomé Convention as having outlasted its usefulness in its present form. The ACP must therefore be prepared for a radically new relationship with the EU once the present Convention expires.
The provision of aid is an integral part of the Lomé Conventions and the sum total made available to the Caribbean (including the dependent territories) is ECU 1,367 million for the twenty year period 19769S. This aid has been welcomed and its contribution, particularly to national development projects, is generally positive. It has been particularly important to the smaller lessdeveloped countries of the Eastern Caribbean who have, in ECU per capita terms, been among its greatest beneficiaries (20).
The question of the future of aid from the EC is therefore important to some countries, if not all. The problem facing them, and the region as a whole, will be the volume and distribution of the aid on offer along with any new conditionalities that may be imposed. The principle that aid will go to the most impoverished and disadvantaged would, under a generous interpretation, funnel aid in the Caribbean to Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Guyana (as the poorest countries) and to Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada and Belize (as the most disadvantaged). However, on a more stringent interpretation the latter may well lose out. The idea that was established in the second Lomé Convention that small island developing countries needed a higher level of assistance no longer enjoys the support of international agencies whilst the plight of sub-Saharan Africa has loomed ever larger in the calculations and concerns of Commission. The policy reforms promoted by the Commission within the Mid Term Review overwhelmingly reflect their perceived needs and are of only marginal relevance to the majority of states in the Caribbean (including the Eastern Caribbean) (21). This particularly applies to conditionalities related to human rights, democracy and good governance since the record of the Commonwealth Caribbean in upholding these is exceptional within the developing world. The issue that arises is therefore not so much the question of sanction if these are not fulfilled, but of recogmtion and due reward when they are regularly met.
The prospect for continued aid at the present level is therefore open to question. The record of a minority of countries in utilising resources available to them under their national indicative programmes is below average while the regional programme has repeatedly run into diffficulties. The importance being attached by the Commission to policy dialogue directly touches on sovereignty and dependence in a region which, with the significant exception of Haiti, has the ability to determine its development priorities and, in a significant number of countries, the capacity to carry them out with its own resources. In these circumstances the importance to the region of rethinking the assistance package it negotiates with the Commission becomes a matter of considerable significance.
The other areas where the Maastricht Treaty is likely to introduce major changes relate to cohesion, social policy, common citizenship, cooperation on police, judicial and immigration affairs, and a common foreign and security policy (22).
Cohesion
Cohesion is aimed at reducing differences between the levels of development in the various regions of the Community and of promoting the economic and social development of the leastfavoured among them. In recent years the principal means of achieving these ends have been the Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund. The budgets of both were doubled between 1987 and 1993 to meet the objectives of the SEM. One of these is that regions in the EC should compete with each other on more equal terms requiring substantial investment from the Community in physical and human infrastructure. The policy of cohesion is thus complementary to policies already pursued in furtherance of the SEM. It is also further strengthened with the establishment under the Maastricht Treaty of the Committee of Regions which has important functions in respect of economic and social cohesion, transEuropean networks, public health, education and culture.
The single beneficiary of cohesion in the Caribbean are the DOM. They are part of the EU and in a Declaration on the Outermost Regions of the Community annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht their specific condition as distant, insular, small, dependent and underdeveloped regions is specifically recognised. As such, they continue to benefit from a programme originally designed to improve their economic competitiveness which was implemented in 1989 in furtherance of the SEM. This programme, identified by the acronym POSEIDOM (Programme d'Options Spécifiques à l'Eloignement et à l'Insularité des DOM), not only sets aside substantial funds from the Community budget for their development (ECU 840 million for the period 199499), but also recognises their location in a region comprised largely of ACP states by encouraging specific measures of cooperation via the Lomé Convention (23). The DOM are thus doubly advantaged (or if another view is taken, receive substantial compensation for their disadvantage). Either way, the net effect is to further the economic assimilation of the DOM into the Community, so confirming their increasing dependence on Paris, as at the same time it emphasises their singular political status in the Caribbean, so widening the political gap between them and the rest of the region. Practical measures of cooperation are not made impossible by this fact, but agreed measures may be more difficult to achieve.
Social Policy
Social policy is the subject of a separate chapter and protocol (to which Britain was not signatory) in the Maastricht Treaty. It develops policy and procedures first laid down in the Social Charter àgreed in December 1989. The main objectives are the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources and the combating of social exclusion. It is this last provision which is probably the most important for persons of Caribbean origin or descent since it has the potential to raise questions of ethnicity race and colour, even though the thrust of the chapter is directed toward the elimination of discrimination against women.
There are just over one million people of Caribbean origin or descent legally settled in the KU. Of these, some 521,000 are from the Commonwealth Caribbean, living primarily in Britain; some 250,000 are from the Caribbean DOM, almost all of whom are to be found in France; and 240,000 are Surinamese alongside 80,000 from The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, mainly living in The Netherlands. (Numbers from Haiti, living mainly in France, or from Cuba and Puerto Rico, living mainly in Spain, are not known). The vast majority of these people are citizens of the Union, either by residence or birth. In Britain this population is estimated at 482,000 of whom 72 per cent aged 16 and over and 87 per œnt aged under 16 hold British nationality. In The Netherlands all those from Aruba and The Netherlands Antilles have Dutch citizenship as do many of those from Suriname. Those born in the DOM are, by definition, citizens of France (24).
The main problems facing people of Caribbean origin or desœnt in the EU are thus not those of citizenship as such (although see below), but issues of racial discrimination in employment and within the community which collectively amount to significant disadvantage in a number of areas. The record of individual countries in tackling the many issues raised differs widely according to legislation, enforœment and custom. The provisions of the Social Chapter are likely to do little to overturn these disparities sinœ most redress will continue to rely on national policies. The ideal of a single European institutional response to the growth of racism throughout the EU is thus unlikely, however much this is canvassed in informal panCaribbean networks in Paris, London or Amsterdam. Equally, the removal of racial discrimination in employment and in the community is more likely to be pursued by invoking 'subsidiarily' (the principle which provides that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the EU shall take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states) than it is within any common framework promoted by the Commission.
Common Citizenship
Part of the problem in realising common action among those of Caribbean origin and desœnt in the EU is the lack of a common citizenship. The Maastricht Treaty creates citizenship of the European Union. Everybody holding the nationality of a member state will also be a citizen of the Union with the right to live and work anywhere in the EU and to enjoy voting rights and to stand in local and European elections in the country in which they reside, subject to specific exceptions. However, not everyone of Caribbean origin or desœnt is affected and some anomalies are created.
The most significant is that between the citizens of British dependent territories in the Caribbean on the one hand and those in the DOM and The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba on the other. The former are British subjects with the right of abode in the United Kingdom (as distinct from British citizens) whereas nationals of the DOM have full French citizenship and those of The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba full Dutch citizenship. This distinction allows the latter two to move freely anywhere within the KU, and to exercise rights and to claim entitlements in, for example, London, whilst the citizens of British dependent territories in the Caribbean cannot do the same in Paris or the Hague. Similarly, while full British and Dutch citizens could, if they so desired, reside freely in the DOM, they cannot do so without permission in the Caribbean OCT (25).
Another anomaly is between those from the Caribbean who as full citizens of the European Union have common entitlements throughout the Union and those who as resident (third country) citizens do not, but are subject to specific and different national restrictions. These are nontransferable from one country to another. Thus Caribbean origin people with rights of residence in Britain have entitlements to work, housing, education, health and social welfare benefits which are not offered to those of similar status elsewhere in the KU. And while The Netherlands gives all residents the right to vote in local elections, Spain does so only if reciprocated and Britain if they are Commonwealth citizens of established residence.
Police Cooperation, Immigration and Crime
The most visible effect for most people in the EU of the 'new Europe' has been the abolition of Customs checks and passport controls at internal frontiers. Goods can move freely between countries and with the entry into force of the relevant articles of the Schengen Agreement at the end of March 1995, people travelling between signatory countries (France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and the Benelux countries) can do so as well. While this provides advantages it is also open to abuse. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty seek to prevent this possibility through cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. Title VI of the Treaty establishes eight areas of common interest between member states: asylum policy, rules governing the crossing of external borders of the Union, immigration policy and policy governing nationals of third countries combating drug addiction, combating fraud, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, customs cooperation, and police cooperation to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime. To support these objectives a new police agency, Europol, has been created. However, the enforcement of policy will be national and the issue of internal security as a whole remains subject to intergovernmental cooperation. Individual member states will therefore remain as the main actors in this area, with the understanding that at international conferences and in international organizations, member states will defend common positions.
The main effect of these provisions on the Caribbean relate to immigration, asylum, drug trafflcking and international crime. In respect of immigration the main change is likely to be the simplification of visa control along with more stringent conditions for entry. These are to be achieved by the adoption of an External Frontiers Convention and a Regulation governing the crossing of the external frontiers/borders of member states. The current situation is one in which nationals of many third countries require a separate visa to enter each state, nationals of other third countries require no visa at all, and yet others require them for some but not others (with different rules applying to those EU states party to the Schengen Agreement and those which are not). This is to be simplified by the establishment of uniform list of third coumtries whose nationals will require a temporary visa to enter the EU. The proposal by the Commission places all the Caribbean countries on this list except for Jamaica (26) Stricter controls than those which applied before in respect of some Caribbean countries and specific member states (e.g. between the Commonwealth Caribbean and Britain) are thus likely to result, although these may be offset by the benefit of a common visa acceptable to all EU countries following initial entry to the Union. This has a particular resonance in the EU because of the DOM. The external frontiers of the EU begin in the Caribbean. The relative from Dominica or St Lucia visiting family in Guadeloupe or Martinique has entered the EU (on an analogy with Puerto Rico and the US). Since this can be done relatively easily and without offficial knowledge the possibility of subsequent illegal entry to mainland Europe (given that France is a member of the Schengen Agreement) naturally arises. The concomitant of easier travel within the EU is therefore a stricter system of frontier surveillance, particularly 'on the part of countries which, because of their geographical position and configuration, are exposed to increased migratory pressure' (27).
The issue of asylum is a major issue within the EU but one that does not yet involve the Caribbean. It may do so, however, should the situation in Haiti again deteriorate (when Paris may seem an attractive haven) and, in particular, should social order in Cuba irretrievably break down. In the latter case it should not be forgotten that many Cubans continue to have family and other links with Spain.
However, the real questions immediately facing the Caribbean are to do with drug traffficking and international crime. The Caribbean is a major centre for both these activities and the countries involved include dependent territories as well as independent states. Britain, France and The Netherlands within the EU are directly engaged in these questions as are other members indirectly, such as Germany and Spain, which are major targets for cocaine traffickers. The net effect has been to raise the policing profile of Europe both within the Caribbean and within Europe.
The focus within the Caribbean has been on providing improved enforcement capabilities to curb drug trafficking and money laundering. This has necessitated increased resource transfers, closer administrative regulation, and latterly greater cooperation between EU countries directly involved within the region and with the United States. The sum total of changes brought about have been considerable but are too complex to be fully discussed here. What must be noted, however, is that they have been significant in redefining the nature of the relationship of Britain and The Netherlands to their dependent territories and go some way to explaining why the policy in both countries of permitting greater domestic autonomy for these islands has been reversed in recent years.
The focus in the EU has been on improving the ad hoc cooperative procedures which have been established to provide better information and coordination between national forces. In drugs trafficking this goes back to 1971 when the Pompidou Group (a body of the Council of Europe) was set up to counter drugrelated crime throughout Europe. This was followed by the creation of the Trevi Group in 1975, which by the end of the 1980s was giving priority to combating drug traffficking, organized crime and money laundering; and the Comité Européen Lutte AntiDrogués in 1989, which subsequently drew up the first European Plan to Combat Drugs adopted in 1990. Among the priority measures agreed were repression of trafficking and international action with consumer, producer and transit countries. In the Caribbean this has led to the establishment of the Bridgetown Group in 1990 as a regional counterpart to the EU parent Dublin Group. It meets monthly on an informal basis and is attended by representatives of British, Canadian, French and US diplomatic missions together with officials from the EC, OAS and UN. Similar groups have been estabFiished in Trinidad and Jamaica. Among their functions are information exchange, financial and technical assistance to combat trafficking and the encouragement of a common approach to the drugs problem (28).
The other area is money laundering. The SEM permits the free flow of capital and services throughout the EC. It is therefore easier for drugs traffickers to move money from one member state to another. To counter this possibility individual states have become members of international organisations seeking to curb this activity. All states of the EU are members of the Financial Action Task Force, party to the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (adopted by the Council of Europe), and subject to the directive on money laundering issued by the EC in June 1991. The significance of money laundering in the Caribbean has also prompted action. The British, Dutch and French are members of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force and with the US help to underwrite its costs. They have also signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with the US which are binding on their Caribbean territories or possessions. Finally, tighter regulations have been enforced in the offshore financial services industries in the British dependent territories (29).
Article K.1 of the Maastricht Treaty provides for the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol) which is targeting drugs via a recently established Europol Drugs Unit. The Treaty also makes drug dependency a priority subject for action in the field of public health and at the Lisbon Council in 1992 the fight against drug trafficking was identified as one of six priority objectives in developing a common foreign and security policy. The idea of an integrated approach to the drugs problem is therefore being developed within the framework of the Treaty and is being promoted by the Commission in a European Union Action Plan to Combat Drugs over the next five years. The major new area to effect the Caribbean will be in foreign affairs and development policy. The Commission proposes 'using the possibilities which antidrugs clauses in the external agreements of the Community with third countries provide for promoting cooperation' and 'making cooperation in the fight against drugs a priority in terms of trade and development policy'. The special preferential trade arrangements for some Andean and Central American countries are specifically mentioned in this regard as also is the Fourth Lomé Convention. The Commission clearly envisages activating the provisions of Lomé noting that it 'has now identified the needs of the countries most affected' and that it will conduct an 'indepth dialogue with the countries concerned with a view to adopting an operational approach in the framework of the EDF' (30). The Caribbean is not specifically identified but given its increasing involvement as a transit point for drugs to Europe it is difficult to imagine that the Commission will overlook it in furthering its new policies.
In all, there has been a substantial growth of coordination and cooperation on matters relating to immigration, asylum, drug trafficking and international crime in the EU in recent years. In many ways it is understandable as a necessary corollary of closer union. It does, however, carry one major intangible danger for the large majority of persons of Caribbean origin or descent. The new 'enemy' in much of Europe is the bogus asylum seeker, the illegal immigrant and the drug trafficker (31). The upsurge of racism in Europe in recent years links all three to 'blacks' end makes little or no distinction as to ethnicity or status. The European citizen or resident of Caribbean origin is as likely to be caught up in this as any other Third World person, particularly given the linkage of drugs with the Caribbean. This must be a worrying problem for Caribbean governments and it is a matter on which coordinated action by them within the EU ought to be considered.
Foreign and Security Policy
The Maastricht Treaty establishes a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), to be defined and implemented by the EU and its member states. This is not the same as a single policy. Member states will continue to determine and pursue policy independently, but they are expected 'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the European Union' and 'to gradually implement joint action in the areas in which Member States have essential interests in common'. There is even a commitment to 'the eventual framing of a common defence policy', although it is very clear that this is far in the future and will involve substantial consideration of the role and future of NATO as well as the Western European Union (32).
The most immediate effect this is likely to have on the Caribbean is in the area of diplomatic representation. All citizens of the European Union are now entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any other member state, on the same conditions as the nationals of that state, where his or her own country does not have diplomatic recogmtion. The Commission has also proposed that member states experiment with joint diplomatic facilities (as in Abuja, Nigeria), especially when interests are not that significant. The effect of these changes on the Caribbean, where most independent states are small, member state representation on the spot is patchy, and diplomatic costs are relatively high, is likely to be one which rationalises current levels of accreditation and may in future reduce it. In its place a practical 'specialisation' may emerge, particularly for consular affairs, with Britain serving the interests of the Union in CARICOM, Spain in the Spanishspeaking republics, and France in Haiti.
The other question is whether 'common essential interests" can be identified. The present pattern of relations in the Caribbean is one which emphasises the bilateral and established metropolitan interest. The emergent pattern, however, is one in which policy is more and more subject to common frameworks. This is readily apparent in the Community's trade and aid relations in the region through the Lomé Convention. The SEM provides another and, moreover, establishes a decisive role for the European Parliament (via the Single European Act) in approving or rejecting cooperation and association agreements with the Community (which govern trade and aid relations with the EC). The Maastricht Treaty provides a third. Development policy is to be decided by qualified majority voting in the Development Council (part of the proceedings of which will now be open) thereby enhancing the profile of Community institutions visàvis national governments. Additionally, the practice of seeking a common European position is to be strengthened, with the prospect that certain objectives should be subject to a common position or joint action. This has already become a feature of policies on human rights where a European dimension is recognizable. The way this will effect the Caribbean is yet to be determined. Issues relating to drugs and cooperation between the OCT have recently led to a stronger identification of 'common interests' by the British and the Dutch in the Caribbean. The questions of transition and human rights in Haiti have led to 'common positions' being adopted by the EU and the national governments. It is therefore not improbable that at some time in the near future the balance of European interests in the region will shift in favour of the multilateral, thereby encouraging the eventual emergence of a single policy toward the independent states of the Caribbean.
The creation of the EU has significant, if as yet largely unrecognized, implications for the future of CaribbeanEuropean relations. Some of these are contradictory, as in the establishment of common frameworks within Europe which divide the Caribbean and its European diaspora (policies on cohesion, some social issues and citizenship), while others have the effect of creating common agendas and mechanisms (as in development policy, measures to control immigration and combat drug trafficking, and promote a common foreign policy). Similarly, a European presence is likely to be enhanced in matters relating to the DOM and the OCT while it will be diminished in the ACP as individual historical associations are diluted by policies designed to promote common European interests in a region of only limited significance to increasing numbers of EU countries. The issues and outcomes of the Lomé MidTerm Review have highlighted this fact and the belief by many that EU relations with the developing world must now be placed on a different footing than in the past. The Caribbean would do well to recognize this new reality and to determine what common political and social interests it has in Europe (in addition to economic interests) in order to maximize its potential effect.
The European presence in the Caribbean is undergoing revision and change. The dominant pattern of bilateral relations is being overtaken by new dynamics which favour the evolution of multilateral relations. While these will not immediately supersede the bilateral relationships they do add another dimension to them and ultimately multilateral relationships (economic and political via the KU) will come to determine the conditions under which bilateral relations can be developed. This new situation has already been reacted to in part by governments and the private sector in the Caribbean. The larger Caribbean countries maintain embassies in Brussels and CARICOM has for a long time adopted a common approach to the evaluation and negotiation of the Lomé Conventions. With the enlargement of the Caribbean ACP, consequent to the admission of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, this arrangement has been institutionalised in a new grouping, CARIFORUM, of which Suriname is also party. The private sector is also widening its horizons. The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce in Barbados has joined forces with the longestablished West India Committee in London to create the Caribbean Council for Europe (CCE) which will be based in Brussels. The task of this organisation is to identify business opportunities and promote and lobby for the region in the European Commission and the European Parliament.
In spite of these positive developments, however, there is still a sense in which the real significance of these changes is not sufficiently understood in the Caribbean. This particularly affects the type of relationship which is likely to be negotiated with the EU in any post-Lomé arrangement. The options most widely canvassed seem to envisage either: (a) a new association agreement with the EU based on the present ACP and designed to preserve as many of the acquis from the Lomé Convention as possible, (b) a new relationship bringing together the Caribbean and Central America to negotiate a common framework agreement with the EU, with the proviso that the new agreement must also be compatible with NAFTA membership; or (c) a sui generis relationship based on the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), taking into account the ideas of partnership between Latin America and Europe set out in the recently adopted 'Basic Document on the Relations of the European Union with Latin America and the Caribbean' (33). The problem with the first two proposals is that while they take on board the experience of EC-Caribbean relations on matters of trade and aid they ignore the new political and social dimensions in the EUCaribbean relationship which will develop from the Maastricht Treaty.
The effect of these is to complicate matters to such a degree that any single agreement is unlikely to satisfy all parties unless it includes within it some means by which differing intensities of relations with Europe can be developed or maintained. A similar point can also be made regarding the ACS proposal, with the additional proviso that issues of preference in trade and aid will be very much secondary to broader agendas of direct relevance to the majority of the Hispanic states but of only indirect concern to many of the Anglophone countries. In short, differences of interest between Caribbean states as regards their relations with Europe as well as by European states (working within and outside of the framework of the KU) in their relations with the Caribbean (and any regional grouping to which they may subscribe) will have to be accommodated if any workable arrangement is to be concluded.
The new concept which has arisen within the EU to allow for differences between member states within a common framework is 'variable geometry'. This allows different member states to proceed towards integration in different areas at different speeds. The idea is already accepted in part in the Caribbean in respect of NAFTA where it is now recognised that several countries are likely to seek individual entry in advance of any agreed 'group approach'. Something similar will also have to inform the negotiation of a postLomé agreement with Europe. This is not to suggest that individual countries or even subregional groups (such as the Organization of East Caribbean States) negotiate separately with the EU, particularly since the EU has in the past preferred 'group-to-group' arrangements with developing countries and is most unlikely to conclude any agreement with the Caribbean (with or without Central America or the other member states of the ACS) other than within a common framework. But it does point to the Caribbean exploring the possibility of bringing 'variable geometry' into play in designing its approach to negotiations with the EU. To put this into effect and to successfully carry it into the outcome of the negotiations themselves is going to require more forethought and a higher level of understanding Europe's medium to longterm interests in the region, as well as the Caribbean's interests in Europe, than has been the case in the past. Fortunately, there is a 'breathing space' of a few years in which the elements of a new approach can be assembled. It is essential that the Caribbean seize this opportunity to develop a negotiating mandate in which the several and different interests of the Caribbean can be finessed and combined in a new policy towards Europe.
* All figures are given in European Currency Units (ECU). Rates of exchange to one US dollar were: 1.116 (1981), 0.763 (1985), and 1.216 (1990).
1. Dieter Frisch, Director-General for Development, European Commission, '1992: The Internal Market and the Developing Countries' (Mimeograph: 25 October, 1988).
2. Michael Davenport and Sheila Page, Europe: 1992 and the Developing World (Overseas Development Institute, London, 1991) chapter 1.
4. See Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, 'The Commonwealth Caribbean in the New World Order: Between Europe and North America?' Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Vol. 34, No. 3,1993) pp. 3972.
5. The ACP comprise the following fifteen independent states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St KittsNevis, St Lucia, St Vncent, Suriname, and Trmidad and Tobago. The OCT comprise the five British dependent territories plus The Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The DOM are the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Guyane and Martinique. Figures for the ACP calculated from Eurostat, 'External Trade of the European Community with the ACP Countries' (Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1992).
6. See Paul Sutton,'The European Community and the Caribbean: Main Issues and Key Dimensions' in Paul Sutton (ed.) Europe and the Caribbean (London: University of Warwick and Macmillan Caribbean, 1991), pp. 99106.
7. Caribbean Association for Industry and Commerce, An Assessment of the Social and Economic Impact of ACP/EEC Cooperation in the Caribbean Region (Study by Dr A. Gonzales, April 1987) p.31.
8. This section draws on papers presented to the University of Hull/West India Committee, Workshop on 19,°2 and the Caribbean (London, April 30May 1,1992).
9. See Tony Thorndike, 'Caribbean Tourism: the European Dimension', Workshop on 1992 and the Caribbean.
10. Figures given in Caribbean Insight, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1994.
11. See Mike McLeod,'Niche Markets in Europe for Caribbean Goods', Workshop on 1,°92 and the Caribbean.
12. See Maxine Harris, 'Promoting Caribbean Trade: A Preliminary Analysis', Workshop on 1992 and the Caribbean.
13. See Anna Kumari-Dickson, 'The Present and Future of the Sugar Protocol', Workshop on 1,°92 and the Caribbean.
14. Caribbean Insight, Vol 17, No.11, November 1994.
15. This has been the one dominant feature of the communiques issued at the end of the series of West India Committee, Europe/Caribbean Conferences held in London, 1988; Bridgetown, 1989; Kingston, 1990; Brussels, 1991; Curaçao, 1992; and Santo Domingo, 1993.
16. The figures in this section are drawn from a number of sources but see, in particular, European Development Agencies, 'Bananas and the Single European Market', Workshop on 1,°92 and the Caribbean; Sir Michael Franklin and Gordon Myers,'A Single European Market for Bananas' (West India Committee, January 1992); and Brent Borrell and Sandy Cuthbertson, 'EC Banana Policies', Hemisphere Vol 5, No. 1,1992.
17. Caribbean Insight, Vol. 17, No. 7, July 1994.
18. See George Louison, 'Hanging to the Slot: The OECS and 1992', Workshop on 1,°92 and the Caribbean.
19. See Commission of the European Communities 'Development Cooperation in the Runup to 2000' (SEC (92) 915 final. Brussels 15 May, 1992) end 'Declaration of the Council and of the representatives of Governments of Member States meeting in the Council on aspects of development cooperation policy in the runup to 2000', The Courier, no. 137, Jan/Feb 1993, pp. 810.
20. See Sutton,'The European Community and the Caribbean' pp. 106-117.
21. See Paul Sutton, 'The MidTerm Review: Some Issues for the Caribbean' Presentation to the Sixth Europe/Caribbean Conference, Santo Domingo, 1012 November 1993 (mimeo, Caribbean Council for Europe, London).
22. This section draws on a number of sources including papers prepared by the European Community Research Unit at Hull University. See, im particular, Juliet Lodge, 'Internal Security and Judicial Cooperation beyond Maastricht' (Research Paper No. 1/92); Monica den Boer, 'Police Cooperation After Maastricht' (Research Paper No. V92); and Roy Worsley, 'A Guide to the Maastricht Treaty' (Research Paper No. 3/92).
23. For details see Commission of the European Communities, 'Draft Joint Decision of the Council and the Commission establishing a Programme of options specific to the remote and insular nature of the French overseas departments' COM (88) 730 final, Brussels, 17 January 1989. Figures for 199499 given in Caribbean Insight Vol.17, No.8, August 1994.
24. Figures mainly from Philip Nanton, 'The Impact of the Single European Market for Social Policy: a Review of the Race Dimension', Workshop on 1992 and the Caribbean.
25. For details see Europe Information,'The European Community and the Overseas Countries and Territories' (Commission of the European Communities: DE 76, October 1993).
26. Commission of the European Communities,'Proposal for a regulation determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States', COM (93), 684 final, 10 December 1993, Ammex.
27. 'Proposal for a decision establishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States', COM (93), 684 fimal, 10 December 1993, p. 15.
28. For details on British policy on drug trafficking see Paul Sutton,'Britain and the Commonwealth Caribbean: the Security Dimension' in Jorge Rodríguez Beruff and Humberto García Muñíz (eds), Security Problems and Policies in the Post-Cold War Caribbean (London: Macmillan, 1995).
29. See Paul Sutton and Tony Payne, 'The Off-Limits Caribbean: The United States and the European Dependent Territories', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 533, May 1994.
30. See Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a European Union action plan to combat drugs', COM (94), 234 final, 23 June 1994.
31. For a discussion of this issue see Hans-George Betz, 'Fortress Europe or Promised Land' in Alan Garfuny amd Glenda Rosenthal (eds), The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner/Longman 1993).
32. For an early survey of CFSP and its likely development see David Buchan, Europe: The Strange Superpower (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993).
33. European Commission, 'Basic Document on the Relations of the European Union with Latin America and the Caribbean', (approved by the Council of the European Union, Luxembourg, 31 October 1994).
Updated on September 24,
1996Developer's Note: These pages were developed for use on the Netscape browser. Please address comments on content or style to Peter Ballantyne, Information Programme, ECDPM