Ethics and Accountability in the African Civil Service
Ethics and Accountability in the African Civil Service
Full text of an article from DPMN Bulletin, 3(1) August 1995: pages 12-14
The obvious negative impact of such practices on productivity; the responsiveness, legitimacy and transparency of governments; the effective implementation of policies; and efforts to bring about recovery and development in general dictate that concerted action by all concerned must be taken upon to deal with this debilitating problem.
Dealing successfully with this phenomenon requires a deeper understanding of its underlying causes. The various authors who have attempted to give a plausible explanation for the problem have often singled out one dimension or another as being the most crucial factor. One maintains, however, that the matter is not that simple and that political, cultural and economic factors all lie at the root of this multidimensional problem.
Over time, the state in Africa has evolved as an undemocratic, autocratic and patrimonial entity. Being essentially a vehicle to execute the unquestioned will and whims of an unaccountable ruling elite, it became an ideal breeding ground for the very forces making for unethical behaviour. Even with the transition to greater political liberalisation, overt paternalism is a quality which the state has yet to effectively rid itself of.
Because recruitment in the civil service has been and is still very much influenced by patronage and political factors, the loyalties, commitment and actions of public officials are often guided and shaped by their primordial loyalties rather than the requirements of impartial professionalism.
The sprawling nature of the state, its over- extended control over economic matters and the licensing and approval powers with which public officials are invested have created greater opportunities for the abuse of office for self-enrichment.
The issue whether the economic crisis is the cause or effect of the ethical crisis in Africa is still hotly debated. Nevertheless, one is of the opinion that while the two crises are no doubt mutually reinforcing, the rapid deterioration of economic conditions experienced by most African countries since the 1980s, has further encouraged public office holders, both politicians and administrators, to seek and obtain rewards in exchange for their services and weakened their aversion and moral abhorrence to such practices.
Repeated attempts have been made over the years to combat corrupt practices and unethical violations. A common feature of those is the enactment of codes and establishment of institutional mechanisms to enforce ethical behaviour.
Nigeria enacted a Code of Conduct in 1975 - which was subsequently incorporated into the 1979 and 1989 constitutions - requiring public officials not to allow personal interests to conflict with their official responsibilities; not to engage in secondary pecuniary engagements; not to operate foreign bank accounts; not to ask for gifts; and to declare their assets immediately after taking office, every four years and at the end of their terms of office. In 1957, Ethiopia enacted a Special Penal Code chapter two of which, under the title "Break of Trust and Offences Against the Interest of the Government and Public," covered provisions governing, inter-alia, the receipt of ill-gotten gains, misuse or waste of public property, forgery of public documents, corrupt practices and acceptance of undue advantage. Côte d'Ivoire established an anti-corruption law and a "Clearance Certificate Against Corruption" in 1977.
A variety of bodies have also been established to curb ethical violations. Ghana, Nigeria, Namibia, Sudan, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have experimented with ombudsmen. Nigeria established a Public Complaints Committee in 1975 to investigate complaints against public officials, and also a Public Accounts Committee in 1966 to assist the legislature in overseeing the expenditure of public funds. Similar bodies were also established in other countries, such as the Working People's Control Committee (1987) and the "Special Court" to try offences related to exploitations, waste, abuse of authority, corrupt practice and favouritism (1981) in Ethiopia; and the Anti-Corruption Squad (1975), Commission for Enforcement of the Leadership Code (1973) and Permanent Commission of Enquiry (1966) in Tanzania.
In some cases, these initiatives were partially successful in achieving some of the immediate objectives behind these measures. However, this has not been generally the case. More crucial has been the fact that the incidence of ethical violation has increased even in countries where a large number of violators have been investigated and/or punished.
The salient questions remain: why have these measures been generally unsuccessful, and, given the extent of the malaise of unethical conduct and the hitherto limited success in dealing with it, is it realistic to expect that this situation can be remedied?
In the first instance, these measures have failed because they were introduced in an overall political and policy environment that was not sufficiently conducive to enable the success of the measures. When grand corruption is rampant at the top level of government and politics, the nature of governance has basically remained undemocratic, unaccountable and patrimonial, and where patronage systems have remained intact, one can hardly expect to enforce measures against unethical behaviour with any degree of seriousness or that the enforcement systems and institutions will be left to function without interference. Thus, the nature of the state and governance and commitment at the highest political level are crucial prerequisites for any successful drive to curb and punish ethical violations.
Second, the measures that have been introduced have been partial in nature, focussing mainly on sanctions.
Third, many of the institutions that were established to promote ethics and accountability often lacked the resources, public visibility, impartiality and public support that are critical for their success.
The enormity of the task to deal with corrupt practices and to promote ethics and accountability in the African public service is not to be underestimated. In spite of set-backs experienced in this regard, it is still possible to score gains in a meaningful manner. Central to this is the need for the dedicated and sustained implementation of comprehensive, broad- based and self-reinforcing measures - and not merely partial solutions - by the government and the public to deal with the multi- dimensional nature of the problem, within the framework of democratic, responsive, transparent and accountable governance.
A comprehensive agenda to promote ethics and accountability in contemporary African public services ought to comprise:
For this reason, a crucial safeguard of high standards of public ethics and accountability in Africa has to fall on the ability of the citizens and people's organisations and associations to hold public officials and politicians accountable for their acts and also to ensure that public institutions fulfil their functions properly and responsibly. The ongoing process of political reforms in Africa should enhance such opportunities.
Finally, the international dimension to the ethical crisis ought not to be neglected. Bribery of public officials in developing countries has often been used by businessmen in developed countries as a fair and legitimate methods for export promotion. Many governments in industrialised countries ignore the bribery, some openly promote it and a few even make it tax-deductible. There is an urgent need to enforce ethical behaviour at the international level if grand corruption in developing countries - including Africa - as a result of international business transactions is to be curtailed. In recent years, Transparency International has been playing an appreciable role in raising the alarm about this problem and demanding that action be taken to remedy it. Any meaningful progress in this direction would require agreement on and the strict enforcement of international conventions punishing corruptors; strengthening international integrity systems; establishing disclosure of external accounts laws; and repatriation of wealth and payments amassed through international corruption. The international community is, however, far from any consensus that is likely to institute such measures.
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