The Danish Aid Administration:
Between Politics and Technical Rationality
Gorm Rye Olsen and Lars Udsholt
The Danish Aid Administration:
Between Politics and Technical Rationality
Gorm Rye Olsen and Lars Udsholt
This paper should be cited as:
Olsen, G.R. and L. Udsholt. 1995. The Danish Aid Administration: Between Politics and Technical Rationality.
(CDR Working Paper No. 95.12). Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research.
E-mail: cdr@cdr.dk
Abstract
This paper presents the current Danish aid policy as a product of a continuous balancing of general policy objectives against the specific organisation and management of the aid administration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is pointed out that the basic framework for Danish aid has remained fairly stable throughout the last 2-3 decades. Poverty orientation, returns to Danish business enterprises, an equal distribution between bilateral and multilateral aid channels, and a strong emphasis on popular involvement with aid issues are recurring features of Danish aid policy. Thus, while aid discussions are popping up in public debates from time to time it is striking how little the overall objectives have changed.
Still, the more specific Danish system of aid administration and management has changed considerable during recent years as a result of a complex balancing between internal ministerial interests and external demands on Danida. It is argued out that the outcome of this process varies over time and with regard to the respective aid issue areas. Furthermore, obviously the result is also a product of the relative strength and capacity that various actors can mobilise and master, both within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Government at large and in Parliament, and within the broader aid policy community.
This paper sets out to present the current Danish aid policy as a product of a continuous balancing of general policy objectives against the specific organisation and management of the aid administration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.(1.) Trends in aid strategies, management and administration during recent years are analysed on the background of the general consensus-based aid policy-making that historically has characterised the issue area. The focus is on the impact exerted by the aid policy community on different aspects Danish aid policy and administration. In the first two sections the basic approach and philosophy for Danish aid is outlined followed by a presentation of current trends in Danish country programming. Subsequently, the Danida approach to the project management cycle is introduced. Following this are two sections on how Danish aid administration have approached the World Bank's policy-based lending, respectively recent trends within the EUs aid programmes. The paper concludes with a section on accountability for Danish aid.
1. The Framework for Danish Aid Policy
Danish aid policy can be viewed from different perspectives. In the only comprehensive analysis of Danish North-South policy, it is argued that this specific policy area can be seen as one element in the totality of Denmark's international relations (Holm 1982). In this perspective, aid policy is similar to general Danish foreign policy which is described as 'reactive balance policy'. The distinctive mark of this form of policy is that development policy, like general foreign policy, has to weigh the many demands and needs which originate both from the external environment and from the Danish society.
It has been argued that aid programmes in the OECD countries more than other government activities have been subject to public concerns and allegations that tax money are squandered on dubious purposes. Furthermore, aid policy might be a field where many different constituencies seek to favour their respective ideals (Administrationsdepartementet 1986a:42).
Thus, it can also be fruitful to look at development policy as a particular policy field which is characterized by the existence of strong norms and morally based attitudes. Seen in this perspective, one can perceive development policy as the specific sector of Danish foreign policy which deals with the normative aspects of the international system. By stressing the normative element, the understanding of development policy falls within the same framework as is used when small states in general are analysed. In relation to the reflections on small states, considerable emphasis is put on norm (giving) behaviour as a central determinant for foreign policy behaviour.
In this context it has been suggested that the concept of "humane internationalism" can establish the necessary connection between domestic policy and international norm setting behaviour. Humane internationalism is defined as "an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty" (Pratt 1990:5). The concept implies that idealistic attitudes and humanistic values are ascribed quite a central position in the understanding of goals and means in Danish aid policy. As the one of the key observers of Danish development policy, Knud Erik Svendsen, puts it what is unique about Danish development policy as a policy field is the fact that it is 'marked by idealism and therefore, it is more open towards arguments, that is to say, it is less tied to the common economic clash of interests' (Svendsen 1981:11). (2.)
It has furthermore been argued that Danish development policy represents a continuation of domestic Danish welfare policies which put emphasis on income transfers as a central element in the redistribution between the rich and the poor. In that respect, the aid policy can be understood as a 'doubling' of or as a transfer of Danish welfare values to the international scene. The strength of these values is an important explanation of the high degree of continuity which has characterised Danish development aid policy since the early 1970s (Svendsen 1989; Svendsen 1995). The resilient nature of this basic development objective has recently been confirmed in the new aid strategy which the Danish Parliament passed in 1994 (Danida 1994d).
The fact that ideological considerations probably have a particularly great significance in this policy-field does not exclude that the policy cannot be understood in the same way as other sectors of Danish politics. Older analyses of the Danish political system point out that Danish politics can be understood as divided up into a number of political sectors where the various actors connected to a specific policy area interact in rather firmly established patterns (Damgaard 1977; Damgaard & Eliassen 1980). However, recent analyses indicate that this sectorisation of Danish politics was more pronounced in the 1960s and the 1970s than was the case in the late 1980s where the political system, was described as far more 'complex and anarchic' (Christensen & Christiansen 1992:29).
While these more or less anarchic features of Danish politics in general have become more salient during recent years, the aid sector has shown a remarkable continuity concerning both the actors involved and the issues discussed. In spite of many public debates, what may be particularly striking is the fact that Danish foreign aid policy has changed so relatively little over the years. Hence, a recurrent feature of this policy field is the tendency to place development assistance above traditional (party) politics, although concessions have of course been made to various interest groups throughout the years (Svendsen 1995:41). Thus, a majority of as much as 80-90% of Parliament has often backed the current revisions of the Danish aid policy agenda during the - usually annual - debates in Parliament on development assistance. Probably, the reason for this continuity - in spite of upheavals in the policy environment - is the number of interested parties to be taken into consideration, thus making it difficult to produce more fundamental changes.
The combination of self-interest and shared values of the most important participants in the aid policy process is tantamount to the existence of a so-called 'policy-community'. The participants in this community have all gained from participating in the policy process and from moderating their mutual disagreements. A policy-community is usually characterised by the stability and the high degree of institutionalization of the relations between administration and organizations (which) primarily (is) a consequence of, and lead to the consequence of, a value community that is attached to the common understanding of what are the problems, and how they should be solved. Radical policy changes which are not accepted by all actors will therefore rarely be realizable within the framework of the existing organisation (Christensen & Christiansen 1992:94).
Politicians, and probably also civil servants as well as most other interested parties, have agreed on the desirability of winning the broadest possible support for Danish aid. Political compromise has thus become the hallmark of aid policy making. The emphasis has been on the broad humanitarian aspects of aid rather than explicitly stated political objectives that might have implied reduced backing from influential parts of the policy community. The prevailing consensus in Danish aid policy making can probably be seen as an indication of the strength of humanistic attitudes in Danish society which has found its external expression in the 'humane internationalism' mentioned.
The significance of ideology in forming Danish development policy does not, of course, exclude the possibility of specific economic and political interests influencing both the form and the content of the policy. It has been argued that the Danish aid constituency can be categorised into three different groupings with a number of overlaps that have allowed for their continued coexistence and parallel influences on policy formulation and implementation (Svendsen 1995:42). The first group is composed of the broader popular aid constituency championing the above-mentioned normative aid objectives and building on alliances between aid professionals among NGOs, research institutes, Danida etc. Secondly, Danish business interests have been influential in securing and preserving quite substantial 'rates of return' to Danish companies etc. by maintaining various models of tied aid (cf. Svendsen 1981; Boel 1986; Martinussen 1989). Finally, a somewhat more loose grouping of actors closer to Government and Parliament have insisted to perceive Danish support for international development cooperation as an integral part of the general foreign policy.
While the existence of a particular 'aid policy community' as argued above has served to maintain a remarkable consensus around foreign aid, the indirect outcome (or 'costs') of this coexistence of competing demands has led to a complexity of more or less independent objectives. These aims may be conflicting in the sense that substantial trade-offs may occur, but the various objectives may also differ with regard to the clarity by which they are formulated and presented to the aid administration. Finally, conflicts may occur between the explicit and implicit agendas for development assistance (Administrationsdepartementet 1986a:10).This situation is not unique to Danish aid as it is found among many official aid agencies who are facing a number of inconsistent norms (cf. Carlsson, Köhlin & Ekbom 1994:38). However, it is an important feature to emphasise as it serves to make the policy base of Danish development cooperation a rather bulky affair that puts high demands on the political and administrative management of Danish development assistance.
Two basic principles have been influential in shaping Danish development assistance. First, since the late-1960s it has been agreed to divide Danish aid on a fifty-fifty basis between multilateral and bilateral assistance, and in general favouring the UN organisations in this context. This strong support for multilateralism stems from two inter-related issues: since Denmark had no experiences from former colonies, the nation should rely on and assist UN efforts in this field. Furthermore, the basic Danish position in the international system as a small state led to a strong support for international cooperation.
Secondly, the volume of aid relative to GDP has been significantly higher than most OECD-members for more than two decades, surpassing the average DAC-level since the early 1970s, reaching app. 0.7% of GDP in 1978 and stabilising at the current target of 1% of GDP in 1992. This reflected Danish support for international resource transfers to bridge the gap between North and South and a political commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7% of GDP. In 1985 a parliamentary majority agreed to reach the target of 1% of GDP in 1992, a decision that implied a rapid growth in aid budgets during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 1992, in response to debates on the need for additional resources to finance environmentally sustainable development (in relation to UNCED etc.) and influenced by the rapidly increasing demands for emergency assistance, Parliament decided on a new and additional budget framework outside the aid appropriations. According to the agreement the appropriation will reach 0.5% of GDP in 2002, and the amount will be equally divided between international environmental assistance (to developing countries as well as to Eastern Europe) and emergency assistance, mainly pre-asylum expenditures for refugees coming to Denmark. (3.)
Table 1: Danish ODA by main categories in % of total, 1984-94
| 1984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | |
| Bilateral aid | 49.6 | 53.0 | 45.8 | 49.7 | 49 | 48.3 | 49.9 | 49.4 |
| Multilateral aid | 47.8 | 44.0 | 50.8 | 46.6 | 46.8 | 47.1 | 44.3 | 44.5 |
| Administrative costs | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 6 |
| Total aid in DKK m. | 4,227 | 5,335 | 6,032 | 6,875 | 7,899 | 8,367 | 8,627 | 9,047 |
Note: For 1984-90, expenditures for information and research are included in 'bilateral aid'; since 1991 these expenditures are reported as 'administrative costs'. Source: Danida Annual Reports.
It is remarkable, especially in an international context, that Danish development assistance have not only been able to avoid budget cuts but that substantial growth rates have also been achieved in a decade during which other government activities have had to accept significant budgetary constraints. While 'Ministry of Finance' logic has impeded on most of the public sector, it was only in 1993 that the first major analysis of budgetary tendencies in Danish development assistance were analysed by an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Finance Ministry (Finansministeriet 1993). Furthermore, the rationale behind aid to developing countries (and the lead role in this respect of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was generally accepted, while in areas such as support for Eastern Europe or environmental assistance the Ministry of Finance insisted on a more prominent role.
Since 1971, the overall objectives of Danish development assistance have been embodied in 'Act No. 297 on International Development Cooperation' (with subsequent revisions). (4.) According to the Act the objective of Denmark's official assistance to developing countries is - in collaboration with governments and authorities of these countries - to support their endeavours to achieve economic growth in order in this way to contribute to securing social progress and political independence in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.Subsequent parliamentary revisions of this Act have mainly served to update and adjust the legal framework for Danish development cooperation, while the basic objective has remained unchanged for more than two decades.
In 1982 a Government appointed Commission on development cooperation was split on the need for revising the aid objectives. A majority argued in favour of specifying that Danish aid should be targeted towards enduring improvements in the living conditions of poor groups of the population and that Danish assistance mainly should be given to the poorer LDCs. During the subsequent parliamentary debate, a majority supported the Commission minority in the view that the existing (1971) broad statement of objectives was the most appropriate to allow for a continuous adjustment of the principles to accommodate for new experiences gained in development cooperation (1987:170).
As referred to in the introductory section, Danish aid policy has generally been perceived of as an integrated element of Danish foreign policy emphasising the need for international cooperation and norm setting in a global environment characterised by both anarchy, economic interdependence and limited policy margins for small states like Denmark. During the 1980s other foreign policy areas such as European integration and defence and military security became rather contentious areas in parliamentary debates, (5.) while aid policy remained an area of consensus seeking. The position of aid policy within the general foreign policy was seldomly made very explicit, though, and with the creation of Danida in 1986 as an independent administrative department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there was subsequently a tendency for aid policy to develop its own momentum.
The reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991 and the arrival of a new government in early 1993 implied some changes in this situation, illustrated by the preparation of an extensive Government memorandum on principles and perspectives for Danish foreign policy after the termination of the cold war (Udenrigsministeriet 1993). In this document, development policy is linked to broader areas such as global environment, debt crisis, and human rights. Still, the presentation of specific trends and perspectives for Danish aid policy takes up only a minor portion of the paper, a situation that the 1994 aid strategy sought to redress. The preparation of the paper was an intra-ministerial process without the participation of the aid policy community, but in addition to being presented to Parliament the completed memorandum was debated at a public meeting with inputs from key actors in Danish foreign policy.
With regular intervals Parliament has debated the objectives of Danish aid, usually in the form of moving a motion requesting the Government to include one or several new objectives in the future design and implementation of the aid programme. In doing so, Parliament has traditionally been influenced by new trends in international development cooperation with a outspoken sensitivity to the contemporary UN development agenda. Hence, issues such as 'rural development', 'basic human needs', 'women in development', 'environment', 'human rights', 'indigenous people', and 'population' have been emphasised by broad parliamentary majorities. (6.) Since the mid-1980s a number of policy papers have sought to outline Danish positions in fields such as women in development, environment, and democracy & human rights. (7.)
The 1994-strategy defines these three areas as 'cross-cutting themes' which have to be pursued at all levels within the Danish aid programme. They are not mentioned in any order of priority in the 1994 strategy. Altogether one chapter (25 out of 100 pages in the full strategy) is devoted to a presentation of a total of seven thematic priority areas: poverty, women, population, environment, trade, debt relief, and promotion of democratisation & human rights. Of these, population, trade and debt relief are 'new comers', while the others represent a continuation of current practice. It has generally been left to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials to draw up the respective strategies, most often in collaboration with various sections of the aid policy community.
It is apparent that until very recently neither the Danish aid administration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (8.)nor others have tried to define more specifically how Danida's activities can and/or have contribute(d) to poverty alleviation, the overall objective for Danish aid since the 1970s (Sano 1993:27). The most current aid strategy maintains the position of poverty alleviation as the overarching objective of Danish development assistance, albeit in a somewhat more detailed and outspoken, programmatic manner than has previously been the case. Poverty alleviation is now perceived as based on a) labour intensive economic growth; b) investments in human resources; and c) good governance and popular participation (note that the last leg of the strategy differs from the World Bank's focus on social safety nets).
Prior to the 1994 strategy paper the poverty alleviation objective has traditionally been operationalised in terms of a focus on low-income countries, on support for social sector development and, occasionally, on support for deprived local areas (e.g. integrated rural development programmes). Hence, so far operational guidelines to e.g. define different groups of poor people or suggestions to target assistance to a certain percentage of the absolute poor have not been prepared. It is currently argued that the implementation of the general poverty strategy will be an integral component of the formulation of country strategies (cf. below) and will appear explicitly in these. Previously, the Government has rejected calls for an explicit and operational poverty alleviation strategy, but work is currently under way with regard to reviewing past performance in the poverty field and including attempts to formulate an actual policy in this area.
Table 2: The distribution of bilateral aid on country groupings, 1984-1994
| 1,984 | 1,986 | 1,988 | 1,990 | 1,991 | 1,992 | 1,993 | 1,994 | |
| LDC Countries | 42.7 | 37.5 | 49.9 | 47 | 44.8 | 40.3 | 46.5 | 42.7 |
| Low Income Countries | 44.7 | 38.2 | 34.2 | 31.9 | 24.9 | 24.7 | 25 | 27.1 |
| Other Dev. Countries | 8.1 | 18.8 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 9.2 | 8.4 | 6.2 | 7.2 |
| Non-country | 4.5 | 5.5 | 11.5 | 16 | 21.1 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 12 |
| Asylum seekers | 7.9 | 8.7 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 11 |
Generally, neither Parliament nor the Danida management have placed the various aid objectives in any order of priority apart from the general commitment to poverty orientation as mentioned above. This seems to be a recurrent source of frustration and tension in the design and implementation of individual projects and in country programming as it is left to individual departmental sections and staff members within the Ministry to define the actual priorities for a particular intervention.
According to the Act on international development cooperation, the main planning instrument for Danish aid policy implementation is the so-called 'rolling five year plan'. This report is prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented to Parliament. Usually, however, the plan does not serve as a motivation or specific 'platform' for debates in Parliament on aid policy issues. Formally speaking the Act requests the Minister to present the budget framework for future aid expenditures, but since 1989 (following the presentation of the Danida Plan of Action) the document has come to include more policy oriented analyses and statements, in addition to the mere budgetary projections that had been the case previously. Currently the plan includes 1-2 pages on each programme country and the major multilaterals with app. half of the text presenting a general picture of the country/organisation while the other half is devoted to listing particular Danish objectives and perspectives. (9.)
In 1988 'Danida's Plan of Action' was presented to supplement the annual rolling five year plan (Danida 1988). It had a five year perspective and appeared as the culmination of a strategic planning effort that had been initiated subsequent to a major study on Danish aid administration and management (Administrationsdepartementet 1986). (10.) Hence the Plan of Action was the first major policy document to appear after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reorganised in 1986 to uplift 'Danida' to one of three departmental units in the ministry. Contrary to the rolling five year plans, the Plan of Action did not dwell at e.g. budgetary matters such as allocations between individual recipient countries but rather pointed at the need to focus Danish bilateral assistance on 20-25 programme countries, hence abandoning the four 'main cooperation countries' concept' that had been adhered to for app. two decades (Bangladesh, Kenya, India, and Tanzania). Furthermore the Plan of Action argued in favour of a more activist Danish position in multilateral development cooperation and a set of criteria for deciding on Danish budget allocations to the international organisations were presented.
The paper was the result of a major intra-ministerial planning process initiated in 1987. It had included the preparation of eight sub-reports (on the perspectives for Danish development cooperation in various countries/geographic regions and with regard to the multilateral organisations). As such there was substantially less involvement of the aid policy community than had been the previous practice with regard to aid policy formulation. Hence, the till then existing aggregation and compromise creating mechanisms had been suspended, although considerable consideration was being made to especially Danish commercial interests (Martinussen 1989:256). (11.) The decisive difference compared to previous exercises was, however, the fact that the aid administration was now taking the initiative rather than reacting to outside pressure. The public and parliamentary debate on the Plan of Action focused to a large extent on the controversial choice of programme countries and the weighing out of middle- and low-income countries (cf. section 3 in this paper) while most other elements in the paper received support or were not explicitly debated.
In 1994 the document 'A World in Development - Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the Year 2000' took the place of the Plan of Action that had by then exceeded its original five year perspective (Danida 1994d). (12.) It is important to note, though, that the new aid strategy was not formulated on the background of an analysis of the experiences with the previous Plan of Action (Ewers 1994:37). It was prepared in continuation of the 1993 foreign policy memorandum to adjust Danish development policies to the new global situation emerging from the profound global changes which have taken place since 1989. As such it is an ambitious document that seeks to address the need for policy coherence in Denmark's relations with developing countries including aid recipients. Hence 'development policy' is meant to encompass all our relations with developing countries, economic and political as well as multilateral and bilateral, although aid policies still attracts the main attention in the paper Danida 1994d:ii). (13.)
Contrary to the 1988 paper, the new strategy was the result of a deliberate 'open door' policy where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited comments from NGOs, business interests, researchers etc. during various stages of the preparation of the document. Hence, this process served to confirm and indeed promote the existence of the aid policy community (or the 'Danish resource base' as ministerial terminology has it), i.a. in the sense that a number of potentially controversial issues had been resolved prior to the finalisation of the document and its presentation to Parliament (Ewers 1994:37).
This was most pronounced with regard to outlining the roles of Danish business and Danish NGOs respectively in overall Danish development cooperation. Here, the Ministry had established two working groups with representatives from the respective parts of the aid policy community to formulate specific strategies on these issues. The results of the working group efforts were published as independent strategies in separate volumes (Danida 1993e, 1993f, 1993g, 1993h) and a summary was included in the 'main strategy' without any alterations. In these fields the strategy is rather innovative and sets out a series of new objectives that includes also Danida demands on private enterprises and NGOs to ensure that they strengthen their capacities for a long-term development engagement with specific identities distinct from those of official development cooperation.
In other areas the strategy represents a continuation of existing policies, e.g. with regard to focusing Danish bilateral assistance to 20 programme countries and in relation to seeking to develop a more proactive stance vis-à-vis multilateral organisations, the so-called active multilateralism. Despite a number of policy statements to the contrary, these two policy initiatives did not really seem to get off the ground following the adoption of the Plan of Action by Parliament in 1989, although the number of programme countries were gradually increased from 12 in 1989 to 20 in 1994. However, a combination of administrative and business interests appear to have been successful in arguing for a rather long-term phase out process in several other countries to whom bilateral assistance had been extended during the 1980s. With regard to increasing general policy dialogue and putting pressure to bear on the multilaterals, the problem appear to have been both lack of ministerial staff resources and - more importantly - the need to first develop a methodology to assess the effectiveness of various international organisations. (14.)
In the follow-up to the 1994-strategy it appears, though, that more decisive action has now been taken. Apart from nine countries receiving transitional assistance, the remaining aid to countries not among the 20 programme countries will be phased out during the next five years. In addition a Plan of Action for Active Multilateralism has recently been prepared indicating organisation specific objectives to improve the performance of international organisations receiving Danish aid (Danida 1994c).
A novel feature of the 1994 strategy was the proposal to base Danish bilateral assistance mainly on 'sector programme assistance' by concentrating on 3-4 sectors within each of the programme countries. This appears to have a several functions. First, it seeks to enable the Danish aid administration to build up more focused administrative expertise in key areas compared to a situation with a highly diversified country programme portfolio. Secondly, it is hoped that this formula will be instrumental in moving away from the long- standing dominance of project assistance in Danish bilateral aid. (15.) It is decided that the selection of sectors will be made on a country basis in connection with the current process of formulating country strategies for each of the 20 countries. The overall objective is to pave the way for a greater integration of external assistance into policies and programmes of recipient countries, hence improving ownership.
On the other hand one can argue that the 'programme country' and 'sector programme assistance' concepts together with the notion of 'active multilateralism' are all illustrations of an underlying current in Danish aid policy to move away from traditional 'neutrality' positions towards using aid as a lever to influence recipient country policies. Up through the 1960s and 1970s the combination of a strongly project focused organisation and the strong support for the UN system had implied a rather responsive position vis-à-vis developing countries both within the UN system (16.)and in the bilateral aid programme. Partly influenced by the generally changing aid relations during the 1980s, partly as an implicit consequences of e.g. elaborating criteria for the choice of programme countries, the 1994-strategy served to confirm a more pronounced Danish position. The full effect of these tendencies are yet uncertain, but they will certainly serve to further politicise domestic aid debates, as argued in the next section.
Compared to the approach pursued in 1988 the intensive involvement of the aid policy community in the strategy preparation during 1993-94 took place at the expense of intra-ministerial participation (Therkildsen 1994:6). Whereas in 1987-88 work groups had been established throughout the Danida structure, work with the 1994 strategy directly involved only a small handful of senior staff in the Ministry. (17.)Hence, one may conclude that ministerial 'ownership' of the strategy is less outspoken today than in 1988 when Danida staff at several levels had been involved. This tendency may be particularly manifest with regard to implementing the new sector programme assistance concept that requires ministerial staff to move away from what has so far been a strongly project focused organisational setup (cf. Ewers 1994:39). One should note, though, that the extra-ordinary amount of staff resources spent in 1987/88 in many ways made it 'a unique exercise' that could not be repeated at regular intervals (Danida 1993b:3)
One further effect of opening-up the policy-formulation process is a less consistent and more all-inclusive paper which is more of a listing of varying objectives than a strategy setting clear priorities and outlining a distinct goal hierarchy. On the other hand the early and strong involvement of the aid policy community prepared the way for a much smoother and less antagonistic public and parliamentary debate compared to the situation in 1988-89.
3. Planning and Implementation of Country Programming
3.1 Geographical distribution of Danish bilateral aid
Since 1989 Danish aid policies have emphasised that bilateral assistance would be focused on 20-25 programme countries. (18.)This objective stands out as a contrast to the situation prevailing from the early 1970s when four 'main recipient countries' (India, Bangladesh, Kenya and Tanzania) had accounted for 2/3 or more of bilateral project aid while the remaining share was widely dispersed. (19.)The 'programme country' concept was part of the 1988 Danida Plan of Action, and while the notion as such was generally supported, the criteria for the choice of programme countries and the countries suggested in the Plan of Action was the source of considerable public and parliamentary debate. The Parliament's Foreign Committee in 1989 identified seven criteria that has so far remained the basis for the selection of 20 programme countries during recent years:
The Committee report emphasises the importance of being able to address issues such as human rights, sustainable development, and women's issues in collaboration with authorities of the programme countries. The Parliament Committee did not suggest changes in the long standing policy that bilateral assistance would only be given to countries with a GDP/capita of two thirds of the World Bank limit for long-term credits (currently USD 1,855). In practice, though, the vast majority of programme countries for Danish bilateral assistance are all low-income economies.
Table 3: GDP/capita and aid figures for Danish programme countries
| Country | GDP/Capita 1993 (USD) | Danish Aid in 1995 (DKK) | Country | GDP/capita 1993 (USD) | Danish Aid in 1995 (DKK) |
| Bangladesh | 220 | 180 | Kenya | 270 | 130 |
| Benin | 420 | 60 | Mozambique | 94 | 165 |
| Bhutan | 385 | 50 | Nepal | 160 | 100 |
| Bolivia | 710 | 25 | Nicaragua | 360 | 125 |
| Burkina Faso | 300 | 110 | Niger | 270 | 25 |
| Egypt | 660 | 190 | Tanzania | 110 | 315 |
| Eritrea | 150 | 20 | Uganda | 190 | 245 |
| Ghana | 430 | 155 | Vietnam | 170 | 95 |
| India | 290 | 185 | Zambia | 370 | 105 |
| Zimbabwe | 540 | 115 | |||
| Total | DKK 2,395 | ||||
Table 4: Geographical distribution of Danish bilateral aid, 1984-1994
| 1,984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1,990 | 1,991 | 1,992 | 1993 | 1994a | 1994b | |
| Africa | 63.8 | 60.7 | 58.9 | 54.8 | 51.3 | 50.4 | 54.8 | 52.3 | 63.4 |
| Asia | 30.8 | 32.7 | 30.5 | 27.3 | 26.1 | 20.7 | 20.8 | 24.1 | 29.2 |
| Latin America | 0.9 | 1.2 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 6.1 | 7.4 |
| Non-country | 4.5 | 5.4 | 7.5 | 5.8 | 8.3 | 6.8 | 5.5 | 6.5 | |
| Asylum seekers | 7.9 | 8.7 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 11 |
Table 5: The 10 main recipients of Danish bilateral aid, 1985-1994
| 1,985 | 1,987 | 1,989 | 1,990 | 1,991 | 1,992 | 1,993 | 1,994 | 10-year average | |
| Tanzania | 15.9 | 11.3 | 14.3 | 11.6 | 14 | 14.2 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 13.6 |
| Bangladesh | 17.7 | 6.3 | 8.5 | 9.8 | 9.4 | 5.6 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 8.2 |
| India | 10.7 | 9.9 | 11 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 7.9 |
| Kenya | 10.9 | 6.3 | 7.6 | 6.8 | 5.5 | 3 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 6.1 |
| Uganda | 0.3 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 5 | 5.6 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 3.7 |
| Mozambique | 2.5 | 3.4 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 3.7 |
| Zimbabwe | 2.6 | 1.9 | 4.2 | 2.2 | 2 | 4 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Egypt | 1.2 | 8.7 | 0.4 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 2.9 |
| China | 3.7 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 2 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 2.8 |
| Nicaragua | 0.4 | 2.6 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.3 |
| Total | 65.9 | 56.8 | 57.4 | 50.5 | 54.3 | 49.6 | 47.9 | 46.3 | 54.1 |
| Others | 34.1 | 43.2 | 42.6 | 49.5 | 45.7 | 50.4 | 52.1 | 53.7 | 45.9 |
Calculated in % of each year's total bilateral aid; average column indicates 10-year averages on the basis of percentage figures - not as share of total DKK allocations during the decade. Country figures include Danida financed NGO projects and technical assistance. 'Others' includes non-country allocations and expenditures for asylum seekers. Source: Danida Annual Reports.
The process to concentrate on 20 countries for the major part of bilateral assistance was initiated in 1989, subsequent to the presentation of the Danida Plan of Action, with the choice of the first 12 programme countries. Only in June 1994 was the process completed with the selection of Ethiopia, Niger and Bolivia. (20.) The 20 countries (excluding Thailand) received a total of 64,2% (DKK 2,9 bill) of bilateral aid allocated in budgetary 1994. (21.)Comparing the 1994 figures with the ten year average column one notes that Nepal is the only newcomer as the 7th main recipient (3,7% of bilateral assistance), while China is the only country from the 1985-94 figures not figuring among the top ten in 1994. Although the relative positions have changed during the period, this is still indicative of the strong continuity in Danish bilateral assistance. The table also points to the significant reductions in aid to the four previous 'main recipient countries' towards the current situation which appear more conducive for flexible country programming.
Danish bilateral assistance is dispersed on a number of different purposes, implying that out of the total budget for bilateral aid only 55% is allocated for official bilateral assistance in the 20 programme countries (DKK 2,655m. out of 4,857 m. in 1995). (22.)Thus, the average budget framework for each country programme is around USD 24 m. The remaining amount is mainly spent on bilateral assistance in other countries (including transitional assistance), other technical assistance programmes, support for NGOs, external consultants, the mixed credit programme, and asylum seekers in Denmark. After some years with substantial growth rates it is now agreed that government support for Danish NGOs should be in the range of app. 17% of the total budget framework available for bilateral project assistance (in 1994 this amounted to app. DKK 600 m.).
The main pressures to extend bilateral aid outside the 20 country programmes stem from three main sources. First, Danish business interests tend to argue that their best export markets are not low- income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, but rather some of the fast growing East and South-East Asian countries. The choice of programme countries during recent years has confirmed the tendency for traditional business interests to 'loose the battle' when new programme countries are being introduced, cf. the predominance of low-income countries. In the Danish context e.g Thailand and Egypt are often considered 'too wealthy' to qualify for Danish aid money. At a more general level, private companies seem to fear lack of flexibility in their access to aid funds if major shares of bilateral aid is tied to use in a limited number of programme countries. (23.)The introduction in 1993 of a mixed credit scheme seems to have satisfied at least some of the business critics, though, as this facility will be available in developing countries with a GDP/capita below USD 2,230 irrespective of their status as Danida programme countries. (24.)
General foreign policy motives appear as a second reason for extending Danish bilateral assistance outside the 20 country programmes. Both Government, parliamentary foreign policy spokesmen, and various NGOs tend to see aid money as flexible funds that can be used to 'reward' promising development trends in individual developing countries. The aid strategy therefore includes the concept of 'transitional assistance' to be employed in such situations. Currently, such programmes have been established in eight countries with a total amount of DKK 5,578 m. for programmes of typically 3-5 years duration with implementation often involving Danish NGOs, the Danish business sector and a number of multilateral organisations. (25.)
Finally, the tables presented above are clear indications of the general budgetary pressures emerging from fiscal policy and exerted on the bilateral aid budget in recent years with regard to financing the rapidly growing expenditures for asylum seekers from developing countries. In 1990 it was decided with retroactive effect for the period 1987-89 that Danida would apply DAC rules allowing expenditures related to reception of asylum seekers from developing countries to be categorised as ODA. These expenditures then grew rapidly until in 1993 it was agreed to gradually phase out such payments from the aid budget in the period 1993-98 and to let the new budget for environmental and emergency assistance finance these activities.
Thus, the current general allocation of the bilateral aid budget can in some ways be seen as a direct expression of the 'costs' related to the continuous involvement of the aid policy community in policy formulation and implementation. However, pressures are also exerted on the aid administration during the process of drawing up country strategies as will debated below.
3.2 Donor procedures for country programming
Traditionally, Danish bilateral aid has mainly be extended in the form of project aid and technical assistance while programme aid has taken up a significantly smaller share than most other like-minded donors. Furthermore, strategic planning was only introduced in Danida from 1987 and onwards. Thus, prior to the previously mentioned intra-departmental planning process in 1987/88, country programming was essentially reactive and based on project proposals emerging from field staff and others. Danida management would promote those ideas that was felt to be in line with current aid policies while discouraging others. During annual negotiations with recipient authorities focus would mainly be on project specific issues, while a proactive approach to country programming was virtually absent from Danida (Administrationsdepartementet 1986c:14-15).
In continuation of the 1988 Plan of Action considerably more work was initiated with regard to preparation of country analyses and strategies. It is, however, remarkable that Danida chose to contract external consultants to prepare the first range of reports rather than relying on in-house staff. This may be explained as a combination of lack of ministerial capacity (both staff availability and experiences with general policy analysis), fear of conflictual relations to recipient authorities in case touchy issues would be included in the reports, and the general politicization of the choice of Danida programme countries since 1989. As a follow-up to this the Danida management in 1992 initiated a new strategic planning process with the preparation of 4-6 country strategies annually starting in 1993. While a consultation with the aid policy community was included in the plans, emphasis was put on internalising the planning process within the ministry (Danida 1993b:9-10).
These plans were to a certain extent overtaken by the rapid preparation of the 1994 aid strategy in the sense that the new orientation inherent in the strategy caused a revision of the original timetable to allow for a faster completion of the process. Furthermore, during the course of 1993/94 several new countries were chosen as programme countries. Finally, the strategy placed considerably more emphasis on involving recipient authorities and the Danish aid policy community.
The aid strategy envisages that for each of the 20 programme countries, a country strategy will be drawn on the basis of an overall assessment of the national economic and political situation. The country strategies are required to set out guidelines for the overall allocation of bilateral assistance, the concentration on and allocation of bilateral assistance between a limited number of sectors and the cross-cutting themes. The country strategy process is devised to enable consultation with both recipient government authorities and actors among the Danish 'resource base', i.e. private companies, NGOs, research institutes etc. with potential knowledge about and interest in a particular country. It is currently expected that the country strategies will be updated on a regular basis and revised every 4-5 years (Danida 1994d:12-13). Currently, 7 have been prepared while an additional 6 are near completion. The first round will come to an end in 1996 when the remaining 7 strategies have been finalised. Upon completion all strategies are publicly available and translated into the national language of the respective programme country.
So far the country strategy process has been rather uneven, both with regard to the involvement of actors external to the Ministry and concerning the content and approach of the individual papers. In the Regional Departments there is still some uncertainty with regard to country programming and consequently also with regard to prioritising the drafting of country strategies. Some strategies have been finalised mainly by Danida staff prior to the presentation to Danish actors and to recipient authorities. Only in a few countries has the process included workshops with local resource persons to identify e.g. key development needs of the particular country before the various strategy elements were compiled. The papers also differ quite considerably with regard to the treatment of cross-cutting themes in Danish aid, e.g. poverty.
Reports from the strategies completed so far indicate that the choice of sectors have been subject to internal ministerial debates as well as to a rather intense politicization from various actors in the aid policy community. This is not surprising since subsequent to the completion of the choice of programme countries the sectoral priorities are currently perceived to be the only major possibility left to influence the future direction of Danish bilateral aid. NGOs and representatives from the business community have clashed in debates on choosing between social sectors perceived to be more poverty oriented on the one hand and infrastructure and productive sectors on the other hand believed to assure higher returns to Danish companies.
Previously, reports from annual negotiations provided the Danida board with the opportunity to comment ex-post on the future profile of Danish aid in a particular country. So far, however, there has been no central mechanism to ensure ex-ante that general aid objectives were actually satisfactorily reflected in the individual country programme portfolio. This may change with the new country strategies, since they are presented in draft formats to the Danida board subsequent to being debated with the Danish actors and recipient government authorities. Furthermore, the papers are also presented to the Parliament Foreign Committee.
3.3 Sectoral distribution and sector policies for Danish aid
During recent years the sectoral distribution of Denmark's bilateral aid seen a decline in aid to 'productive sectors' and 'economic infrastructur' while 'social infrastructure' has maintained a high share of total bilateral aid. Public health, agriculture, transport, and water supply & sanitation stand out as major sectors during the first half of the 1990s, accounting for app. 1/3 of bilateral assistance on average during 1992-94. The declining figures for productive sectors and economic infrastructure are i.a. a result of changes in the tying procedures for Danish aid agreed upon in 1988. Prior to 1989 high shares were achieved in e.g. agriculture, industry and energy as a result of the tying of aid to these sectors to Danish deliveries. (26.)
The 1994 aid strategy contains specific mentioning of the following areas as priority sectors for future Danish assistance: agriculture, natural resource management & food production; infrastructure; social sectors (including water & sanitation); and the private sector. It further states that the shares of productive sectors and of economic infrastructure will be increased, while aid to the social sectors will be maintained at the current levels (Danida 1994d:21-27).
Since 1993 a number of 'Danida Sector Policies' have been prepared covering the following sectors: energy, fisheries, health, forestry & agroforestry, vocational education & training, water supply & sanitation. A paper on agriculture is currently being prepared. In addition a number of environmental 'issues papers' were prepared in 1989 on environmental issues in 'human health', 'fisheries development' and 'agriculture & humid areas'. The formulation of sector based policies has occasionally been the cause of tensions between the 'Technical Advisory Service' (TSA), who have been in charge of drafting the papers, and the Danida Policy Department. Generally, the tendency seems for the Department for Policy & Planning and the respective regional departments to gain increasing influence in decisions on sector priorities and country portfolio design, while TSA focuses increasingly on issues related to project design and periodic project reviews. The current move towards sector programme assistance may change this division of labour, although the modalities for planning and implementation of the new form of aid are yet to be clearly resolved.
Table 6: Sectoral distribution of bilateral aid in percent of total, 1990-94
| 1,990 | 1,991 | 1,992 | 1,993 | 1,994 | |
| Social infrastructure | 34.4 | 29.2 | 32.1 | 36.7 | 38.9 |
| Economic infrastructure | 22.4 | 19.6 | 15.6 | 14.6 | 16.4 |
| Productive sectors | 26.5 | 17.7 | 18.7 | 14.3 | 14.9 |
| Multi-sector | 0.4 | 3 | 2.9 | 3 | 3.1 |
| Programme aid | 0 | 10.1 | 6.8 | 9.3 | 4.3 |
| Asylum seekers | 7.9 | 8.7 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 11 |
| Un-specified | 8.1 | 11.7 | 8.2 | 10.5 | 11.4 |
| Memo: Total bilateral aid in DKK m. | 3,416.0 | 3,873.0 | 4,040.0 | 4,308.0 | 4,544.0 |
Increased sector concentration and more emphasis on general programming and policy issues rather than project interventions appear reasonable in an attempt to improve impact by achieving the necessary 'critical mass' of resources and professional expertise in the aid efforts. However, four critical observations with regard to the concentration on key sectors should also be made at this stage. First, it must be assumed that the final result of the current country strategy process will be highly diversified in terms of both a relatively high number of total sectors where Denmark will be active, and with regard to how sectors and sector programme assistance is defined and delimited. Thus, while country programming may improve at the level of individual programme countries this does not necessarily imply an easing of the pressures at the level of central Danida management.
Second, it appears plausible that Danish interests (particularly in the aid administration and among the business community) will have a significantly greater say in actual sector choice than those of recipient authorities. Thus, despite the generally increased transparency in the country strategy process, one may experience less openness and more hidden agendas when it comes to linking sector choices to the objective of securing Danish supplies as a result of bilateral aid. While explicit concerns for increasing the returns to Danish business have seldomly been made explicit during the process so far, it is evident that the choice of sectors is an important means to achieving this objective. The difficult art of balancing Danish commercial interests with other aid objectives remains an issue in Danish aid administration despite the 1994 strategy and its emphasis on developing new aid modalities.
Third, parallel to experiences from the country concentration phases it is to be expected that it will take time before the sector concentration is reflected in budgetary allocations. Despite good intensions there is still considerable 'informal pressure' from missions abroad, from the business community, from Government etc. to maintain a certain 'flexibility' rather than to tie rather than to predetermine the use of every available krone.
Finally, general tendencies in recipient countries and among official donor organisations may also imply less room for manoeuvre for Danida at the sectoral levels. This emphasises the need for Danish aid to identify and exploit existing and potential comparative advantages as well for establishing effective links between sector and project interventions on the one hand and general policy dialogue on the other hand (cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994b:75f).
3.4 Relations to other donors and recipient governments
Denmark takes part in co-ordination in a number of settings such as World Bank Consultative Groups, UNDP Round Tables, within the European Community, between the Nordic countries and on ad hoc basis with varying groups of donors, with a primary emphasis on the 20 programme countries and in particular where embassies have been established. While resident missions are expected to take an active role in liaising with other donors, there are no general guidelines and the picture varies considerably between the 20 programme countries. This depends not only on the effectiveness of the donor coordination set-up (particularly the capacity and priorities of the World Bank resident mission), recipient government attitudes vis-à-vis donors' 'ganging-up', but also on the relative size of the Danish country portfolio compared to other donors, and interests among individuals at the Danish embassies. Generally, the move towards country programming has meant a greater awareness of seeing Danish aid in relation to other donors.
In recent years, Danida has gradually put somewhat more emphasis on participation in the policy dialogue concerning macro-economic issues, particularly within the framework of the World Bank's Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA). These efforts are primarily initiated by the Danida administration in Copenhagen but may also involve resident missions in the programme countries. One such example is participation in public expenditure reviews with the view to ensuring realistic allocations for the social sectors. On the other hand, staff at local missions may often take the lead in involving Danida in the preparation of sectoral master plans to support the policy framework and capacity of local line ministries. Such work will often take place between a smaller group of bilateral donors and 1-2 multilaterals.
The decision to concentrate Danish aid on fewer sectors in programme countries is expected to be accompanied by more intensified policy dialogue at the sector level with the recipient authorities.Guidelines are currently under preparation. Currently, annual negotiations take place between Danish and recipient authorities on progress made with regard to implementing the country portfolio and particular problem-areas (often related to individual projects). The negotiations take place in recipient capitals with a Danish delegation headed by senior officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen assisted by staff from the local Danish embassy.
3.5 The future course of Danish country programming and implementation
The general trend in country programming of Danish aid is towards an increasing politicization compared to previously when country portfolios were mainly the product of the aid administration promoting individual project proposals while others were discouraged. The drafting of country strategies and the choice of sector focus both imply a more open and aggregated presentation of how general Danish aid objectives is sought to be achieved. In turn this implies an increasing externalisation of country programming and implementation compared to the previous situation where the Danida administration would act rather autonomously. Thus, one may in the future witness a situation with fewer general policy debates (on tied aid, poverty alleviation, environment etc.) and an increase in discussions of specific country and sector programmes that are felt not to be in line with the various objectives among the policy community.
A trend towards more country and sector focused debates may also change the role of the aid policy community as more this will demands on the actors for more specific information and experience as well as more capability to combine this insight with analyses of general trends in Danish aid. In general, the increased emphasis on country and sector programming in Danish aid may imply less possibility to shift priorities and focus with short notice as the more strategic planning will require more long-term commitments.
It has also been argued, though, that it is a recurrent feature for official aid administrations to constantly move back and forth between professional and internal demands for country and sector concentration on the one hand and external, political and commercial pressures for expanding the number of recipient countries and/or sectors. The decisive issue in this case is for the aid administration to adopt a sufficiently flexible programming system to accommodate for these conflicting tendencies (Bruszt, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:51).
During the last decade one has witnessed increasing attempts to professionalise Danish development assistance. Expanding aid volumes, growing number of tasks put out for tenders to Danish private companies and a higher degree of decentralisation of authority away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen to Danish embassies and from there to individual project implementation bodies are among the factors underlining the need for more coherent concepts and more streamlined administrative procedures. It is no matter for surprise that such efforts have been dominated by ministerial initiatives, whereas the aid policy community in general have not been involved or concerned with these issues. (27.)
Contrary to other European aid administrations there is no central administrative body that controls all project proposals. However, all proposals are presented to Danida's Board (an autonomous entity with 9 members appointed to advice the Minister) prior to submission to the Parliament's Finance Committee. All projects exceeding DKK 5 m must be approved by the Board, while all spending above DKK 20 m. goes to the Parliamentary Finance Committee for approval.
The various guidelines for project management are based on the Logical Framework Approach (LFA) which is presented to Ministry staff and external consultants etc. in Danida's Logical Framework Handbook. The Danida Project Management Cycle is comparable to that of several other bilateral aid agencies and it is divided into the following three stages: project preparation, project implementation, and project completion. (28.)Responsibility for revising and updating the various guidelines rests with Danida's evaluation unit.
1. Project preparation includes identification, project formulation, pre-appraisal, feasibility studies, project appraisal and appropriation. Key documents to be employed during this phase includes the 'project proposal document' that is a standardised presentation of a given project on the basis of project identification and project formulation. Furthermore a 'project document' is required on the basis of the appraisal report and additional comments from the cooperation country and from Danida. The project document forms the basis of decision-making by the appropriation authorities, and it also includes the 'project implementation plan'. The project preparation phase is concluded with a Government Agreement or a Letter of Understanding signed by authorities in the Cooperation Country and Danida.
2. Project implementation is to be based on 'Annual Plans of Action', current monitoring and periodic project reviews. In general the responsibility for monitoring project implementation has been delegated from the Ministry in Copenhagen to local Danish embassy officials in collaboration with the project implementing organisation. The task of preparing and carrying out project reviews lies with the Technical Advisory Service in the Ministry in Copenhagen, though. While project reviews form part of the internal Danida monitoring process, it is now commonplace to involve external consultants in most reviews.
Obviously, project implementation involves significant amounts of interaction between Danish authorities and government officials in the cooperation country. The specific division of labour and responsibilities is of course subject to considerable variations between countries and individual projects. In the case of very large and/or complex projects the Guidelines allows for establishing a specific 'monitoring and evaluation unit' as part of the project. Project management staff are generally required to prepare semi- annual 'progress reports', although the frequency may be higher, depending on individual circumstances and wether it is a well established or newly initiated project.
3. Project completion involves the 'handing-over' to the project-implementing organisation in the cooperation country, the project completion report (PCR), and evaluation studies that may be undertaken in order to extract experience applicable to the specific project and with regard to future development activities. PCRs are prepared by staff who have been involved in implementation and the information provided in the reports is forwarded to the Evaluation Unit in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for further analysis.
During recent years Danida has worked with a rolling two-year evaluation programme, comprising 12-15 studies annually. The programme is categorised into the following six types of evaluations: interim evaluations are studies of ongoing projects with a major focus on project management and implementation. Ex-post project evaluations aim at assessing what lasting impact a particular project has had or is likely to have, while evaluations of aid forms analyse one specific aid modality (e.g. support for NGOs or balance of payment support), usually by looking at several projects or programmes in different countries. Sector evaluations look into all or most Danida supported projects within a given sector (e.g. agriculture or electrification) in one or several recipient countries, while thematic evaluations address Danida experiences with regard to aspects such as women, technology or human rights. Finally, country programme evaluations study the entire Danida programme in one of the 20 programme countries, including the various instruments in country programming (Danida 1994a:1-3). (29.)
The evaluation guidelines emphasise the following three categories of users of evaluation findings: project staff & recipient authorities, Danida, and others, including Danish media. Evaluation studies are seen as a means to ensure accountability for the use of aid funds, and therefore reports are generally made available to the general public, including comments from Danida on key evaluation findings. Key findings from the evaluation programme are presented on an annual basis to the Danida board together with an updated two-year programme, while a brief overview of completed evaluations is included in the Danida Annual Reports. (30.)
Generally, it appears that evaluation studies and other feed back mechanisms in project management are not key concerns for the aid policy community despite the fact that such reports seek to document the extent to which the overall aid policy objectives are actually achieved. Rather the main emphasis remains on influencing the policy formulation parts of Danish aid administration, i.e. the input side. Thus, project management issues has remained primarily the domain of the Danida administration. Internally in Danida it has also been argued that experiences highlighted in evaluation reports are often not sufficiently utilised by staff in the operational departments (Bruszt, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:22).
5. Policy-Based Lending (31.)
For many years the concept of 'neutrality' was a fundamental element in Danish aid relations. During the years of 'North-South dialogue' in the UN system on a new economic world order, Denmark perceived herself as a bridge builder between radical third world demands and the conservative Northern 'camp'. Bilateral aid was only little affected by these debates, though, as these issues were almost solely raised in relation to multilateral organisations. Furthermore, Danish aid remained based on project interventions without much concern for the national and sector policy framework for project implementation. The World Bank's move to policy-based lending in the context of structural adjustment programmes in 1980 and onwards was initially viewed with some scepticism, but there are no reports of Danish initiatives in this field until the latter part of the decade. (32.)However, during the last ten years conditionality issues and broader questions of policy reforms have been raised to an increasing extent.
There are three major reasons for this development. First, like it has been the case for other donors the World Bank has become an increasingly important international determinant of Danish aid policies. This is narrowly linked to the growing importance of the Bank in development cooperation, particularly the poor African countries to whom Denmark has traditionally given priority in its development cooperation (Mosley et al. 1991:3-61). Secondly, the move since 1987/88 towards more strategic country programming has implied more concern with general policy issues in recipient countries and with regard to seeing Danida assistance in relation to other donors. Finally, during the 1980s the seriousness of the African crisis had an increasing impact on Danish bilateral project implementation - a fact that served to pave the way for a realisation that economic policy reforms were required. One should note, though, that until very recently (app. 1992/93) general debates on policy based lending and its impact on Danish bilateral aid has only to a limited extent been raised by the Danish aid policy community.
Changing Danish positions in this field in the mid-1980s was partly provoked by developments in Tanzania, the main recipient of Danish aid during many years. In the first half of the decade Denmark together with other like-minded countries had supported work undertaken by a team of foreign and local experts to 'break the ice' between Tanzania and the Bretton Woods institutions. However, the continuing economic depression and a deteriorating foreign exchange position finally prompted the Tanzanian government to adopt an IMF/WB supported adjustment programme. Experiences from this process seem influential in making Danida subsequently support the World Bank's efforts in this field. Thus, the 1988 Danida Plan of Action appeared as the first major policy document emphasising the need for economic liberalisation and structural reforms in Africa (Danida 1994b:67).
5.1 Danish efforts to influence World Bank policies
However, the relationship between the Danish aid administration and the World Bank is not only a question of the Bank influencing Danish policies. From 1986 initiatives were taken in the World Bank by the Nordic constituency requesting the World Bank to address the social impact of adjustment programmes (Bodelsen 1989). (33.) These concerns were voiced in parallel to analyses emerging from UNICEF studies aimed at promoting the 'adjustment with a human face' approach. Thus, a thorough assessment of Denmark's particular influence on the World Bank's adjustment policies is hampered by the fact that Denmark and the other Nordic countries have not been alone in their criticism. UNICEF and others have argued along the same lines. On the other hand the emphasis on seeking alliances among other donors and multilateral institutions has given Denmark more influence on the Bank's objectives and policy than the modest Danish financial contributions to the World Bank Group could otherwise provide (Bodelsen 1989:142).
Danish aid has occasionally been employed in co-financing operations with the World Bank but in a rather ad hoc fashion where it is hard to discern any deliberate Danida policy to employ aid funds to influence World Bank policies and conditionality (Danida 1993c). (34.)Such financing has primarily been extended in support of specific projects and only rarely as cofinancing in the form of balance of payments support for World Bank structural adjustment programmes. In the period 1987-93 70% of the balance of payments support was allocated through 'commodity import support' programmes, while only 4% were spent of co-financing of World Bank SAP-credits, and 3% spent on debt relief. Furthermore, in the same period Danish balance of payment support was equivalent to app. 7% of the bilateral aid budget, a smaller share than for most other like-minded countries. (35.) Thus, while Danida acknowledges that cofinancing or parallel financing of World Bank adjustment operations can be viewed as an 'admission ticket' to getting a position in the policy dialogue on macro-economic issues, this option has not been used very often (Danida 1994b:8,70).
Contrary to policy initiatives at central levels in the World Bank, it seems hard to identify deliberate Danish positions on adjustment in the policy dialogue at recipient country level before the early 1990s. Furthermore, it appears that Danish attempts to influence the course of adjustment have then primarily taken place during the implementation rather than the appraisal and design phases, although options exist for such initiatives. Meetings of the respective Consultative Groups have often formed an occasion to raise adjustment related issues (Danida 1994b:67ff).
5.2 Current Danish policies on policy-based lending
Currently, however, Danish aid policies are increasingly concerned with adjustment policies and the course and content of the policy dialogue between donors and recipient, as exemplified in the recent aid strategy where such issues take up the major part of the section devoted to stating Danish policies with regard to international financial institutions. Major emphasis is placed on the social aspects and impact of adjustment and on increasing local capacity and on ensuring ownership during programme design and implementation (Danida 1994d:44ff; Nielson 1995). In terms of Danish financial support in connection with structural adjustment a gradual change is foreseen. In the future, less resources will be made available for direct balance of payment support. Higher priority will be given to debt relief and more resources will be made available for budget support in connection with Danish support for recipient countries' sector programmes. It is expected, though, that the share of balance of payments in total bilateral aid may remain at the comparatively speaking low levels highlighted above.
Although the World Bank's Special Programme of Assistance for Africa (SPA) has been operating since 1987, it is only since 1987 that is has received substantial attention in Danish aid policy and administration. A high level SPA working group has been set up within Danida as well as a SPA task force with the objective to involve Danida more in the cooperation with other donors on aid to Africa. Danida is engaged in several of the working groups Danida 1994b:73).
An increased and more explicit Danish profile in the policy dialogue between donors and recipients as stated in the new aid strategy may carry with it a number of dynamics with rather different potentials. Thus, there may be several opportunities as well as weaknesses in the current Danida approach to policy dialogue, while the current external environment among donors and recipients may imply both new opportunities and threats to the succesfull achievement of Danida objectives. This is highlighted in a recent Danida evaluation report, from which the table below is reproduced.
SWOT Analyses of Danida's Strategy with Regard to a Furthering of its Policy Priorities by Means of an Increased Role in The Policy Dialogue Strengths Weaknesses · concentration of funds and · lack of experience from capacity on a limited number of participation in the policy contries and sectors dialogue · Danida comparative advantages · limited macroeconomic capacity within sectors which are of Danida and of the Danish increasingly coming into the resource base searchlight of the international · internal organisation does not donor community facilitate a comprehensive · strong local rooting and approach in the different levels expertise of the policy dialogue and donor · one of very few donors coordination increasing the share of its ODA · Danida very limited influence · increased focus on Danida's at the boards of the IFIs role in the policy dialogue (new · the recipient governments strategy document, working being marginalised in the groups on SPA and co-financing) process of donors trying to pursue their own policy priorities Opportunities Threats · other donors are increasingly · World Bank counter measures criticising the Bank's approach due to fatigue with bilaterals · the Bank is in its policy trying to interfere in the papers giving more emphasis to policy dialogue issues which are Danida policy · other donors taking over priorities Danida's key issues and · the Bank's statutes makes it positions at the local level possible for donors to · too many donors each wanting participate in the appraisal and influence on too many issues, negotiations of SAP blurring the policy dialogue and conditionalities burdening the administration of · the Bank is presently more the recipient countries liable to let other donors in on · lack of well defined and the policy dialogue as aid universally accepted Danida volume is on a downward trend strategies and instruments
The more explicit Danida policy stance in this field appears to be partly the result of external pressure from parts of the aid policy community, primarily the NGOs, partly effected by an increasing consciousness within the Danish aid administration to improve bilateral aid effectiveness by also taking up issues that are not confined to project-based interventions. Adding to the issues raised in the table one could further argue that a more marked Danish profile vis-à-vis the World Bank also carries the risk that this part of Danida policies will be further politicised. In turn this may serve to narrow the freedom of manoeuvre previously enjoyed by Danida staff and management in relation to the international financial institutions.
Danish contributions to development cooperation within the European Union account for almost 15 % of Denmark's multilateral development assistance or about 7 % of Denmark's total aid budget. This corresponds to 2,1% of the total EDF.
6. Relations with the European Union
After a cautious start in 1973, Denmark has adopted a more active approach in relation to the EC aid policy especially since the latter part of the 1980s. The relatively clear change in attitude to the Community aid policy was presumably inspired by the new dynamism in the EC cooperation appearing after 1986. It is, however, hardly not enough to explain the conspicuously active Danish contribution to the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty, which took effect in 1993.
In this process, Denmark played an active role in formulating the policies concerning aid and trade. This new and active Danish policy is only understandable if it is seen as part of a broader Danish negotiating strategy prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. It can be argued that aid policy, in particular, represented a "soft" area, where Denmark could have both an interest in and especially an opportunity to give high profile to the Danish views. The possible influence could thus be used as an argument or a "proof" of Denmark's ability to win influence in the EU under a new and closer European co-operation regime.
From a Danish point of view, the currently most important task within the EU development co-operation is to further elaborate the development policy framework set out by the Maastricht treaty. In official Danish aid circles there is a widespread feeling that the content of the articles 130 U - Y in the Maastricht treaty is a proof of the influence in the EU as the principles are more or less identical with Danish bilateral aid goals. Danish proponents refer especially to the wording of article 130 U, according to which Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation is complementary to the policies pursued by the member states. It is especially important that the Article points out that Community policy must promote the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them. In addition, Community policy must support the campaign against poverty in developing countries. Viewed from Denmark, these formulations are bringing Community development policy in line with the fundamental poverty orientation of Danish bilateral assistance. That the poverty orientation has now been enshrined in the treaty is considered a reflection of Danish influence.
The concern for poverty implies that Denmark works to maintain Africa in focus in European development policy. Priority is also given to increase the participation of poor countries in the international trade co-operation. The Danish Government thus considers the EU to possess a major comparative advantage in the sense that it is possible to combine a wide geographical coverage with an integrated approach to areas of development policy such as trade, economic cooperation and aid (Danida 1993a:77).
During the negotiations of the mid-term revision of the Lomé IV Convention, Denmark particularly sought to strengthen the agreement in three key fields: 1) increased demands for respect for human rights, democracy and good governance, 2) improvements in the administrative procedure for the Union's development assistance, and 3) greater emphasis on qualitative criteria in connection with payment of funds under individual country programmes.
Generally, Danish officials argue that it is possible to exert a far greater influence than can be expected from its share of 2,1 per cent of the EDF and from the 1,8 percent Danish share of the general budget. (36.)Among the reasons for these perceptions are undoubtly the large and growing aid volumes during recent years as well as good international reputation of being both poverty oriented and effective. Having argued that Denmark has been quite successful in promoting its goals into the wording of the EU development policy, it can in no way be seen as a guarantee that deeds live up to the words, however. Generally, it seems that Danish moves towards a more activist position in multilateral development cooperation has been most pronounced in relation to the United Nations system, which has been the focus of various studies and reform proposals. No such specific initiatives have been launched so far with regard to EU where the ordinary meetings in the Council of Ministers remain the primary focus for Danish policy-making.
Official Danish aid positions vis-à-vis the EU have traditionally argued for the Commission to be the 13th donor rather than a supra-national actor with a mandate to coordinate and influence the individual aid programmes of the 12 member states. Furthermore, it has been emphasised that there is still scope for improvement in the performance of the Commission's own programmes, and that one should concentrate efforts in these fields rather than moving to increased policy and operational coordination at headquarters and field levels. It is often stated that the Commission seriously lacks capacity in Brussels as well as at the delegations to cope with expanding mandates related to coordination of the member states. Thus, Danida emphasises the key roles of the World Bank and (to a lesser extent) the UNDP in aid coordination, and it is argued that the EU should not duplicate this work.
At the field level the Commission's portfolio is regarded as that of any other multilateral institution, and Danish officials usually do not engage in a lot of interaction with EU officials at the level of recipient country capitals. On the other hand increasing weight appears to be given to participating in fortnightly or monthly meetings, organised by the local delegation to exchange views on the overall political (i.e. not specifically aid related) development in a given country.
The Danish aid policy community has generally payed less attention to EU aid compared to the two other major 'pillars' in Danish multilateral aid: the UN system and international financial institutions. Partly this is a reflection of relatively little knowledge on EU aid in the public and among aid professionals outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More importantly, it must be seen in the light of general Danish debates on European cooperation and integration - a discussion that often tended to focus on the virtues of EC/EU membership as such rather than debating the specific objectives and contents of individual EU programmes. More recent Danish debates on EU aid has tended to focus on more systemic policy issues (the level of Lome IV funding, coherence between trade and aid policies of the EU etc.) rather than more specific issues related to the performance of EU aid at the country and project level. 7. Organisational Structure for Planning, Implementation
Since the start of Danish aid programme in 1962 (with an initial staff of 20) and until 1991 the aid administration has been handled by separate units within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Still, prior to 1986 aid administration was subordinate to other departments in the Ministry, thus e.g. limiting Danida's direct access to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. (37.)Proposals to place Danida outside the framework of the ministry (as an independent directorate or as a new ministry) had previously been rejected on the grounds that aid policy had very close relations to general foreign policy and to foreign trade policy. The status of Danida within the ministry had been debated, though, a few times during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s but without major changes occurring (cf. Administrationsdepartementet 1986e). In 1982 the Government appointed Commission to review Danish aid policies had been rejected by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in looking into aid administration issues as part of its work (Udvalget vedr. dansk bistandspolitik 1982:174f).
However, by 1986 a major management review of Danida led to substantial changes in the organisational set-up for Danish aid administration, as a series of recommendations were implemented from late 1986 and onwards (Administrationsdepartementet 1986). The main thrust of the review report is presented here since it is an important precondition for assessing the more recent organisational changes with regard to Danida's position within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The review led to strategic planning being employed as a key management instrument (resulting i.a. in the 1988 Danida Plan of Action), and it was emphasised that more attention should be paid to aid operational purposes in contrast to the previous situation where aid policy issues had dominated. The review also paved the way for an integration of the different aid modalities (tied aid, project aid and technical assistance) all to be administered by regional divisions and field missions in stead of functional divisions in the ministry. Rather than 'diplomats' rotating between different ministerial positions (most of them not aid related) Danida would in the future base itself on a core staff of permanently employed 'aid administrators' in the regional departments plus an expanded number of sector and technical professionals to serve in support functions during project preparation and execution. (38.)
The review further emphasised the need to reduce the then high staff turn over caused by ministerial rotation policies, as it was argued that Danida files and not staff members were the sole carriers of corporate memory. It was suggested that individual positions should be occupied by the same staff members for at least 3 years (Administrationsdepartementet 1986c:18; ibid. 1986d:4). Finally, the review made Danida initiate a decentralisation process whereby decision-making competence would be transferred away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headquarters in Copenhagen to Danida field missions in developing countries and further on to staff at the individual, Danida supported projects. (39.)
The basic administrative framework for these and other changes was to be a new separate department within the Ministry, Danida, with its own permanent secretary and direct access to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chart 1 presents the administrative structure of Danida in the period 1986-91.
In 1990 a review of experiences with the reformed Danida structure pointed at a number of achievements and problems related to the administrative setup (Bruszt, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990). First, it was emphasised that an integration of the different aid modalities in bilateral aid had been successful, and that important achievements had been made with regard to strengthening Danida's policy and sector professional capacity. The review pointed out, however, that this had happened partly at the cost of weakening the core element in the new structure, the regional departments. Lack of resources and reduced decision-making competence had made the regional departments loose out to the newly established technical departments. The resulting structure had become a highly complex matrix organisation with uncertain lines of command.
Furthermore, Danida management had not given higher priority to aid operational issues (as opposed to policy advice for the Minister of Foreign Affairs) such as it had been suggested in the 1985/86 management review. Finally, an end to rapid staff rotations between different positions had not been achieved, although this had also been a key issue in the management review. Periods of service had increased somewhat, particularly for heads of departments, but was generally deemed much too low, especially for personnel from the general foreign service who came out with an average of 1,3 year on a positing (Brustz, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:43f).
7.1 The 1991 Danida reorganisation
In 1989 the Government set up the Foreign Service Commission to define centrals tasks for the foreign service in the years ahead and to recommend changes in the organisation of the entire foreign service (Udenrigskommissionen 1990). Following the recommendations of the Commission in 1990, a new organisational structure was implemented in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991 to create a unified foreign service with two administrative groups organised on the basis of geography rather than the previous three functionally divided departments. (40.) One group (called North) covers the industrialized countries plus the former Communist countries in the East and another group (called South) covers all the developing countries. (41.)Each of the two groups is headed by a state secretary. In addition to the geographical modes of organisation, two other main changes was included in the new structure: a unified foreign service where staff members move between positions throughout the organisation rather than being confined e.g. to Danida; and a system of joint representations in the foreign service abroad. Thus, individual civil servants may serve and seek promotion in each of the two groups. However, in the South Group the Technical Advisory Service has been taken over from the previous administrative structure, and the various technical and sector specialists are not part of the foreign service as such.
The Foreign Service Commission reconfirmed and reinforced the 1986 decisions to decentralise major decision-making competence to embassies abroad. Furthermore, the previous system with separate Danida field missions and embassies was changed, so that embassies would also be in charge of the Danish aid programme. Concerning decentralization and simplification, this was mainly aimed at the embassies, representations and missions abroad. The basic idea was to establish units abroad of such a size that they would be self-sustaining and where the head of the mission had both a considerable room for disposing over his own yearly appropriations and a possibility to act within certain broadly defined policy guidelines.
Organisation chart 2: The Danish Aid Administration since 1991
The unique feature of the 1991 reorganisation is that each of the two groups are responsible for all aspects of Denmark's bilateral relations with a given country i.e. the political, economic, developmental and - to a certain extent - the commercial. However, should be careful not to over-interpret the new structure as a radical departure from the past, since the setup still includes departments within each of the two main groups that derive their rationale from a functional division of labour rather than mere geography (Christensen 1992:94). The implication of the new structure is also that since 1991, 'Danida' is no longer synonymous with an administrative entity. In formal terms the 'label' is currently to be used only as the joint identification for Danish aid activities. However, due to the dominance of the aid programme within the South Group portfolio (Brustz, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:71), 'Danida' is often used synonymously with the South Group. Furthermore, in reality the majority of the currently 19 embassies related to the South Group are based in Danida programmes countries and thus have a major emphasis on aid administration.
Table 7: Danish development administration staff and field missions, 1985-1995
| 1,985 | 1,987 | 1,989 | 1,990 | 1,991 | 1,992 | 1,993 | 1,994 | 1,995 | |
| Total Danida/ South Group | 209 | 231 | 252 | 257 | 260 | 344 | 360 | 395 | 392 (42.) |
| Assignments abroad | 35 | 41 | 45 | 48 | 51 | 104 | 103 | 127 | 111 |
| Field missions/ embassies | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 19 |
7.2 Autonomy of overseas offices: delegation of powers
As mentioned previously, increasing decentralisation has been included among Danida administrative objectives since the mid-1980s. (43.)The precondition for effective decentralisation was perceived to be the formulation of a more strategic planning framework to guide the individual aid operations. Prior to the 1991 reorganisation main emphasis had been on strategic planning while a more thorough decentralisation of aid operations still remained (Brustz, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:1). However, administration of technical assistance generally rests with the embassies, and in some in some countries procurement have been contracted to private companies.
To gain momentum in the further process decentralisation has been suggested as a means to overcome the structural tendency for Danida management to focus primarily on policy advice to the Minister rather than involving themselves with aid operational and implementation issues. Thus, rather than insisting that management at headquarters should devote more attention to such issues, it would be a preferable option to decentralise responsibility for such tasks away from the top Danida management in Copenhagen to regional departments and further on to embassies in the programme countries (Bruszt, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990:39, 62).
Local embassies play a key role in project identification and project monitoring together with government authorities. Furthermore, it is expected that embassy staff conduct a regular dialogue with local authorities on sector policy issues as well general development issues. Still, with regard to appraisal, review, evaluations and annual negotiations participation from headquarters are more pronounced: primarily with regard to the regional departments and TSA. In order to utilize the resources available in the most cost-effective manner and enhance the quality of Danish development aid, Danida is currently examining the possibilities of further decentralisation by transferring additional responsibility and decision making competence from the headquarters to the embassies.
Since 1988 Danish embassies have been authorised to approve small projects and enter into contracts with e.g. local private companies, local NGOs etc. in amounts of up to DKK 1 m (the Local Grant Authority, LGA). This amount was raised to DKK 3 m. in 1990. The individual embassies have applied the LGA in very different manners with a general tendency for embassies with a limited project portfolio to spend large amounts (as much as 20% of the total budget framework) while embassies in countries with a long standing Danida presence and a larger project portfolio to spend rather small amounts. Danida policy is currently to limit LGA spending to a maximum of 10% of total financing planned within the area covered by the embassy.
Within the aid administration experiences with this aid modality are generally considered to be very positive. It provides for more flexibility, the possibility to test new partners on a limited scale before entering into major engagement, and the possibility to use the Local Grant Authority to support various national and local NGO initiatives is sometimes felt to be very useful in enhancing the Danish 'profile'. Problems have related to lack of staff at the embassies to assess new applications and to ensure satisfactorily accountability with recipients. Furthermore, new projects are often initiated according to the personal priorities of individual project officers at the embassies and as staff turn over is high this leads to many new activities being started and to neglects in project follow up. Finally, coordination problems have been a recurrent feature with regard to division of labour and information procedures between the embassies, the regional departments, the Danida policy department and the Finance department (Danida 1994e).
7.3 Experiences with the new administrative structure
Experiences with the new 'South Group' structure are mixed. Some contend that aid professionalism is lost due to pressures from objectives emanating from the traditional diplomatic service. Furthermore, it is argued that swift rotations to ensure the training of 'generalists' for the foreign service take place at the expense of much needed continuity at both headquarters and field levels. The direct administrative linking of general foreign policy motives with aid implementation may imply less attention to complex aid professional issues. On the other hand it is also argued that a more holistic approach has proven to be beneficial, i.a. since other Danish Foreign Policy objectives that might serve to undercut aid objectives are often absent in most of the low-income countries where Denmark is operationally involved. Furthermore, improved coordination between different policy areas may lead to enhanced policy coherence. Finally, some assert that the 'main streaming' of development aid administration implicit in the new structure is actually an advantage to the sidelining that could take place in a set-up that allowed aid to be isolated from general foreign policy making.
The appointment since 1993 of a Government Minister for Development Cooperation is probably as important as any reorganisation for the standing of the Danish aid administration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Government as such. This is the first time since the late 1970s that a government minister has been appointed, as the general government position otherwise has been to include development cooperation within the portfolio of the Foreign Minister. On the one hand this has served to reduce the standing of aid in the general government hierarchy: before 1993 aid policy 'benefitted' from the traditional 'number two position' of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government, now development cooperation ranks much lower. On the other hand, a politically appointed minister tends to imply a higher profile in public and parliamentary debates on aid, than has been the case previously. Probably more important is the fact that ministerial management is now guided much closer in aid policy formulation and administration than previously.
Before leaving the reorganisation, it may be relevant to reflect on what kind of interests have been involved in the recent changes. Unlike other Danish ministries the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can generally said to rely less on tight relations to and interaction with major interest organisations in the particular sector. However, both with regard to export promotion & foreign trade and concerning aid administration the ministry is involved in considerable interaction with external organisations (Christensen 1992:99). With regard to Danida it is important to note, though, that while the organisation of Danish aid administration has been the subject for debates (e.g. in the Council for International Development Cooperation), major actors have generally abstained from involving themselves directly in debates on the virtues of reorganising aid administration. (44.)Thus, it is assumed that internal interests and internal pressure groups can have considerable influence on the arrangement of the organisation (Christensen 1992:100).
It can be argued that there was a merging of the interests of the Minister at that time (who in his portfolio had both foreign affairs and aid) and top management in the Ministry. In addition to a complex management structure in general, the Danida management felt to an increasing extent that the 1986 reorganisation was not working according to the intentions. The aid administration had ended in having a centralized structure where the technical and sector staff had gained a unintentional concentration of decision making power (cf. Brustz, Hedberg & Wallroth 1990; Christensen 1992:102). At the same time, there was a majority in Parliament in favour of increasing aid allocations to reach 1% of GDP by 1992.
However, following three decades of rapid growth with headquarter staff more than doubling, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself was subject to the very strict appropriation limitations as were other ministries at that time. (45.) On the contrary aid budgets continued to grow, and already by 1990 the aid budget was six times the size of the budget for the rest of the Foreign Service (Udenrigskommissionen 1990: vol. I, 81).This necessarily lead to considerable tensions between the different departments of the Ministry. Also there were often critique of the concrete projects financed by Danida as well as critique of Danida itself. All these circumstances produced a recognition of the need to tighten the whole organisation in order to secure control of concrete arrangements and also to carry out a decentralization which changed the guidance system and the administrative procedures in a direction to make the Ministry and the Minister himself less vulnerable to critique from the outside, i.e. from the press, the public and from the Parliament. One expected consequence of the reorganisation was that it would now be easier to give clear political signals of where the aid policy was heading.
It seems that most of the involved persons and groups were in favour of the reorganisation when it was proposed. The Minister and ministerial management quite obviously supported a reorganisation which would strengthen management and which opened for a better coordination of the whole field of foreign affairs. (46.) Generally, it is the prerogative of Danish Governments to organise the civil service according to their priorities, and Parliament and the general public often abstain from involving themselves in such debates (Christensen 1992:102). Finally, the aid policy community was satisfied as long as the new structure provided them with sufficient entry points to policy decisions and access to aid funds.
8. Accountability and the Role of the Aid Policy Community
Questions of accountability and the involvement of actors external to Government and Parliament have been of central importance since the initial phases of the Danish aid programme. Thus, popular organisations were highly influential in shaping the Danish aid programme during the first half of the 1960s. Furthermore, during the following years it became a deliberate Government policy to use aid funds for development education programmes implemented by Danish NGOs. Contrary to perceiving the Danish aid programme as part and parcel of traditional foreign policy with its emphasis on bureaucratic and diplomatic distance from broader public and political debate, it was considered vital to involve broader sections of the Danish society. Accordingly, the participation of different Danish organisations would serve to avoid e.g. tax payer criticism of government funds being squandered on useless purposes (Jørgensen 1977).
It was in line with these considerations that the first Parliament Act on Development Cooperation (1962) instituted the Board for International Development Cooperation and the Council for International Development Cooperation. Both the Board and the Council have been maintained in subsequent aid legislation. The role of the Board is to advice the Minister of Foreign Affairs (or the Minister for Development Cooperation), who also appoints the nine members, including the Chairman. Although the Act does not provide further details, it seems firmly established that at least six of the nine members represent various organisations, among them the Danish Trade Unions Congress, Danish Industry, and the Agricultural Council, while two NGOs have served as observers in addition to the full members. (47.)
The Board considers all project applications above DKK 5 m. whereafter they are submitted to the Minister. Projects with a budget above DKK 20 m. are presented to the Parliament Finance Committee. Historically, the Board has given priority to project applications rather than to giving the Minister policy advice on broad aid related issues, a field where ministerial staff has dominated. (48.) During recent years debates on country strategies and broader policy issues have gained increasing importance. Still, neither in relation the 1988 Danida Action Plan nor with regard to the 1994 development policy strategy has the Board played any key role (cf. Martinussen 1989:247). Furthermore, the Board does not appear to have been involved in the process of selecting programme countries for Danish bilateral aid. The Board's annual report on its operations (usually app. 10 pages) is included in Danida's Annual Report.
Still, considerable de facto decision-making power is vested in the Board, whereas the Council primarily serves as a broad forum for debates with its app. 75 members representing an array of Danish organisations and aid interested individuals. The Council convenes at ordinary meetings twice a year to debate the rolling five year plan and the Danida annual report respectively. In addition the Council meets for thematic sessions 2-4 times annually. While there does not appear to be any link between Board agendas and parliamentary aid debates, one can occasionally observe a connection between Council debates and subsequent discussions in Parliament.
It is obvious that both the Board and the Council serve importants function with regard to accountability. It is noteworthy, however, that in the eyes of the public and within Danida itself the Board may be perceived as securing legitimacy rather than accountability since almost no information on the deliberations of the Board are generally available apart from the brief annual reports. On the contrary the Council promotes debate and exchange of information and thus provides interested parties, including the NGOs, the media and parliamentarians with a possibility to hold Danida accountable. Still, it is notable, though, that the main actors in the Council are generally drawn from the core of the established aid policy community rather than other organisations and environments without the same amount of immediate day to day involvement with aid policy and management issues.
8.1 The role of Parliament and the political parties
According to article 2 in the act on Denmark's International Development Cooperation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs (or recently) the Minister for Development Cooperation presents to Parliament a plan for Danish ODA appropriations for the coming five year period, the rolling five year plan. However, while the plan is debated in the Council Parliament does not have tradition for debates on the paper, neither in full sessions nor in the Foreign Committee. Furthermore, the Budget is in general subject to considerable debate, but proposals and decisions on aid appropriations are seldom receiving much attention.
When in opposition the parties to the right usually include reductions in the aid budgets in their proposed amendments, but generally these are not in the focus during subsequent parliamentary debates on the size and composition of public expenditures. Furthermore, it is notable that since the then liberal government was defeated in the 1985 vote o